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Evidentiary Privileges for Cohabiting Parents:
Protecting Children Inside and Outside of Marriage
Mark Glover*
INTRODUCTION

Unmarried cohabitants have long endured the stigma that
accompanies a lifestyle that society deems immoral. Couples who
choose to live together out of wedlock traditionally have been
ostracized for "living in sin 1 and have been characterized as
engaging in "deviant behavior."2 Society's traditional disapproval
of this behavior was reflected in the laws of most states, which,
prior to the 1960s, criminalized unmarried cohabitation.3 However,
"[s]ocial mores regarding cohabitation between unmarried parties
have changed dramatically in recent years." 4 The once depraved
act of unmarried cohabitation has largely lost its moral
disapproval. 5
Copyright 2010, by MARK GLOVER.
J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 2008.
1. Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and
the United States: Controversy Over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social
Institution, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 195, 203 (2006) ("Historically... in the United
States, there was great social opprobrium attached to adults who were 'living in
sin'-cohabiting without being married-and there was no legal recognition
given to this type of relationship."); Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of
Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 517 (2007).
2. See Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior:
Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 275, 276 (1981);
Renata Forste, Prelude to Marriageor Alternative to Marriage?,4 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 91, 91 (2002).
3. See Fineman, supra note 2, at 276 ("Society's long recognized
preference for formal, ceremonial marriage was complemented by the threat of
punishment for cohabitation."); Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law
of CohabitationforOpposite Sex Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005).
4. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141,144 (Mass. 1998).
5. See Jamie Alan Aycock, ContractingOut of the Culture Wars: How the
Law Should Enforce and Communities of Faith Should Encourage More
Enduring Marital Commitments, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 236 (2006)
("[A] majority of people no longer finds cohabitation by unmarried partners
morally troubling."); Goldberg, supra note 1, at 517 ("The immorality of living
together [has become] a thing of the past."); Anne E. Simerman, Note, The Right
of a Cohabitant to Recover in Tort: Wrongful Death, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium, 32 U. LOUIsVILLE J. FAM. L. 531,
532 (1993) ("[A] fundamental change [has occurred] in the way society views
unmarried cohabitation. A practice once considered illicit and immoral is now
both commonplace and accepted.").
*
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Paralleling this shift in society's attitude toward unmarried
cohabitation, most states have repealed their anti-cohabitation
statutes. 6 Though a small number of states still have these laws on
the books, prosecutors rarely enforce them.7 When unmarried
couples are charged with criminal cohabitation, these statutes
generally are not used to interfere with otherwise law abiding
couples, but are invoked to intervene in extraordinary situations,
such as "to force a violent cohabitor to leave the home,
8 or to coerce
an unmarried cohabiting father to pay child support."
Society's gradual acceptance of unmarried cohabitation has
been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of
Americans cohabiting outside of marriage. 9 In 1960,
approximately 440,000 unmarried American couples lived
together. 10 By 1990 that number had increased to 2.85 million, and
at the beginning of the new millennium 4.9 million unmarried
couples were cohabiting." This ten-fold increase in the number of
cohabiting unmarried couples has raised the percentage of U.S.
households composed of unmarried cohabitants to 4.5% in 2000,
which is up from the 0.8% mark of 1960.12 Further increases in
cohabitation rates are expected in the coming years. 13
The decline of societal condemnation and the near universal
decriminalization by state legislatures have not brought about
complete lelgal equality between marriage and unmarried
cohabitation. Unmarried cohabitants do not enjoy many of the
benefits bestowed upon married couples by courts and
legislatures.' 5 The primary rationale for not "establishing an
6. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 148. States that have yet to legalize
unmarried cohabitation include Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (West 2007
& Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335 (West 2004); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-4 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
7. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 149-51 (summarizing the work of
Professor Martha L. Fineman).
8. See id, atl50.
9. See LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE. E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE,
FAMILY LAW 229 (3d ed. 2005) ("[T]he rate of cohabitation has increased
dramatically over the last 30 years throughout the Western world.").
10. Aycock, supra note 5, at 234.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Sean E. Brotherson & William C. Duncan, Rebinding the
Ties that Bind: Government Efforts to Preserve andPromote Marriage,53 FAM.
REL. 459, 460 (2004)).
13. Forste, supra note 2, at 91.
14. See infra Part I.A.

15. See id.
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informal legal status for" unmarried cohabitants, which would
provide accompanying legal benefits, is that doing so would
"undermine marriage as a key~social, cultural and legal institution,
to the detriment of society."'
One area in which the law continues to treat unmarried
cohabitants differently than married couples is the law of evidence.
In certain circumstances, a spouse may refuse to testify against the
other spouse or to reveal information concerning confidential
marital communications at trial. 17 However, in no jurisdiction are
18
unmarried cohabitants afforded the same evidentiary privileges.
Consider for example the trial of Richard Lane.' 9 Lane had lived
together with his girlfriend, Faye, for six years when Faye was
called to testify against Lane in his prosecution for first-degree
murder. Despite the fact that the couple had two children together
and had portrayed themselves to the public as husband and wife,
the court did not allow Faye to invoke the marital privileges
because the couple had never formally married.2 ' In part because
of Faye's testimony, Lane was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment.22
The murder trial of A.J. Moore provides a contrasting
example. 23 On the eve of trial, Moore married Susie Jones, the only
eye-witness to the homicide.24 Though the matrimony was only
hours old, the court ruled that the _prosecution could not compel
Jones to testify against her husband.? The court explained:
It makes no difference at what time the relation of husband
and wife begins . . . . When the marriage ceremony is
performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the
witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of the
defendant and is prohibited ... from testifying against her
husband.26

16.
17.
18.

Mahoney, supra note 3, at 166.
See infra Part II.A.
25 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5574 (1989) ("Courts have been less [than]
enthusiastic about extending the marital privileges to non-marital relationships;
the idea has been rejected by every court that has considered it.").
19. Lane v. State, 364 N.E.2d 756 (Ind. 1977).
20. Id. at 760.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 758.
23. See Moore v. State, 75 S.W. 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903).
24. Id. at 497.
25. Id. at 498 (finding fault with the trial court for allowing the wife to
testify at trial).
26. Id.
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This Article argues that the law should continue to expand the
benefits available to couples living together out of wedlock so that
both of the aforementioned couples would be protected by
evidentiary privileges.27 Specifically, the Article proposes a new
evidentiary privilege that would protect unmarried, cohabiting
parents. Under this proposal, an unmarried couple would enjoy the
benefits of the marital privileges if they share a home with their
child. This cohabiting-parent privilege would further the policies
of family preservation and child protection, both of which are
principal policy justifications of the marital privileges.
Furthermore, providing cohabiting parents evidentiary privileges is
less susceptible to the traditional criticism of expanded legal
benefits for unmarried cohabitants because the cohabiting-parent
privilege would not reduce a couple's incentive to marry.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
traditional legal treatment of unmarried cohabitation and the recent
recognition of limited legal benefits for unmarried couples. Part II
explains the evidentiary privileges available to married couples and
explores the rationales for providing marriage the benefit of these
privileges. Part III then argues in favor of a new privilege for
unmarried, cohabiting parents. Finally, Part 1V compares this
proposal for a cohabiting-parent privilege to recent proposals for
evidentiary privileges that would apply to all unmarried
cohabitants.
I. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNMARRIED COHABITATION

A. The TraditionalLegal Treatment of UnmarriedCohabitants
Traditionally, unmarried cohabitants not only faced moral
condemnation from the public, but also encountered legal
disapproval from the courts. Even after most states repealed their
anti-cohabitation statutes, unmarried couples living together
possessed "a 'negative status' in the law.",28 This negative status is
best exemplified by the refusal of courts to recognize contract right
claims between these unmarried couples. Contracts that would
have been valid between roommates not engaged in a sexual
relationship were deemed invalid and unenforceable between
unmarried cohabitants because the courts "view[ed] ... [the]

27.

See infra Part 111.

28. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 159 (quoting William A. Reppy, Jr., Family
Law, Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposalfor

Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REv. 1677, 1678 (1984)).

2010]

PRIVILEGES & COHABITING PARENTS

755

relationship, and therefore
the contract between [the parties], [as]
29
immoral and illegal.,
Not only does the law generally treat relationships between
unmarried cohabitants differently than relationships between other
unmarried persons, but it also treats unmarried cohabitants
differently than married couples. Unlike the relationship between
married partners, "the relationship of unmarried cohabitants is not,
as a general rule, recognized as a legally significant family status.
As a result no benefits or obligations, either between the partners
or vis-A-vis third parties and the government, attach to the
relationship." 30 In contrast, the law confers benefits upon the
marital relationship in many contexts, including taxation,
inheritance, tort law, criminal law, social welfare, adoption, and
child custody.3 '
B. Recent Recognition ofLimited Legal Consequences of
UnmarriedCohabitation
Though the law has been resistant to confer the consequences
of marriage upon unmarried cohabitants, over the course of the
past thirty years, courts in a few states have gradually extended
some legal benefits to non-marital relationships. Areas in which
courts have extended legal consequences to unmarried cohabitation
include property rights, domestic violence, and housing
discrimination.
1. PropertyRights
The case of Marvin v. Marvin involved a seven-year
relationship during which the cohabiting parties never married.32
When the relationship ended, the defendant forced the plaintiff to
29. Id. See J. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudill, A Reconnaissance of
Public Policy Restrictions Upon Enforcement of Contracts Between
Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93, 106 (1984) ("Because of the perceived
immorality of these relationships, even express contracts between cohabitants
were not enforced."); Reppy, supra note 28, at 1678-80; see, e.g., Wallace v.
Rappleye, 103 I11.
229, 249 (I11.
1882) ("An agreement in consideration of future
illicit cohabitation between the parties is void. . .
30. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 158.
31. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass.
2003) ("The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous,
touching nearly every aspect of life and death. The department states that
'hundreds of statutes' are related to marriage and to marital benefits."); see also
David L. Chambers, What I? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the
Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447, 447
(1996); Mahoney, supranote 3, at 159.
32. 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).

LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 70

move out and refused to continue providing financial support. 33
The plaintiff sued for half of the property that the couple acquired
over the course of the relationship, claiming that the parties
"entered into an oral agreement" in which they agreed to "combine
their efforts and earnings" while they lived together and also
agreed to "share equally any and all property accumulated as a
result of their efforts .... "
Diverging from the traditional judicial treatment of agreements
between unmarried cohabitants, the California Supreme Court held
that "[t]he fact that a man and woman live together without
marriage, and engage in a sexual relationship, does not in itself
invalidate agreements between them relating to their earnings,
property, or expenses." 35 The only restriction the court placed on
these agreements was that the contract could not be based upon "a
consideration of meretricious sexual services." 36 Therefore, while
the court recognized a contract between parties engaged in a nonmarital sexual relationship, the court also indicated that it would
not recognize a contract for non-marital sexual services. In
addition to recognizing express contracts between unmarried
cohabitants, the court affirmed the availability of other bases of
recovery for unmarried cohabitants, including implied contracts,
37
constructive trusts, resulting trusts, and unjust enrichment.
In the thirty years since Marvin was decided, nearly all states
have adopted a similar approach to the treatment of agreements
between unmarried cohabitants.3 8 Although some states have
adopted more restrictive approaches to recognizing contract rights
between unmarried cohabitants, 39 only Illinois, Georgia, and
Louisiana continue to maintain the traditional approach.
While the California Supreme Court recognized unmarried
cohabitants' right to make agreements regarding property
distribution, it did not recognize unmarried cohabitation as a legal

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 113 ("Neither is such an agreement invalid merely because the
parties may have contemplated the creation or continuation of a nonmarital
relationship when they entered into it.").
36. Id.
37. Id. at 122.
38. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 159.
39. See David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried
Cohabitants: The American Law Institute's Principlesof Family Dissolution, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1467, 1474-76 (2001) (detailing approaches adopted in
other states).
40. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United
States, 26 LAW& POL'Y 119, 125 (2004).
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status that confers property rights upon the parties. 4 1 The state of
Washington, though, has recognized unmarried cohabitation as a
legal status with respect to property distribution. In Connell v.
Francisco, the Washington Supreme Court held that the state's
property distribution scheme applies not only to divorce, but also
42
to the dissolution of relationships between unmarried cohabitants.
However, because cohabitants have chosen not to marry, the court
held that the distribution scheme should apply only to property
acquired during the relationship. 43 The court reasoned that dividing
property acquired before the commencement of the relationship
"equates cohabitation with marriage; ignores the conscious
decision by many couples not to marry; [and] confers benefits
when few, if any, economic risks or legal obligations are
assumed."" Additionally, not all relationships between unmarried
cohabitants qualify for this newly expanded right of property
distribution. 4' 46 Only those relationships that are "stable" and
"marital-like
enjoy the benefit of Washington's "assimilatrion]
[of] unmarried cohabitants into the legal regime of marriage.
2. Domestic Violence
Early statutes regulating domestic violence "were often quite
limited [in defining the persons protected]. They saw the problem
of 'domestic' violence as essentially a problem of 'marital,'
'family' or 'household' violence, and some even limited relief to
Unmarried cohabitants likely
presently married partners. . .4."8
were not protected under these early statutes because of the belief
that unmarried victims would simply leave the abusive situation,
and, therefore, domestic violence laws were not needed to protect
unmarried women. 49 However, beginning in the 1970s, the
"battered women's movement" began to shift the perception of

41. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 160.
42. 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 834. "Relevant factors establishing [the requisite] relationship
include, but are not limited to: continuous cohabitation, duration of the
relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for
joint projects, and the intent of the parties." Id.
47. Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2001).
48. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 193 n.298 (quoting CLARE DALTON &
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 502 (2001)).
49. Id.
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domestic violence from' ' 50a familial concern to a problem based upon
"gender subordination.
State legislatures took notice of the need for protection of all
victims of domestic violence, whether married or simply
cohabiting with an unmarried partner, and today a majority of
statutes authorize the prosecution of unmarried cohabitants for
domestic violence. 51 Thus, in most states "the straightforward
policy consideration underlying domestic violence statutes is the
prohibition of violence that occurs within all [types of] adult
relationships," regardless of whether the
52 relationships involve
married spouses or unmarried cohabitants.
3. Housing Discrimination
Both state and federal law provide protection against housing
discrimination. 53 The Federal Fair Housing Act, for example,
prohibits landlords from "refus[ing] to sell or rent.., a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, familial status, or
national origin." 54 Despite the breadth of this federal legislation, no
explicit safeguard is provided for unmarried cohabitants."
Similarly, state statutes generally fail to exolicitly protect
unmarried cohabitants from the biases of landlords. 56 Though most
50. Id. at 194-95.
The battered women's movement defined battering within the larger
framework of gender subordination. Domestic violence was linked to
women's inferior position within the family, discrimination within the
workplace, wage inequity, lack of educational opportunities, the
absence of social supports for mothering, and the lack of child care.
Thus, the issue highlighted by women's advocates and addressed by the
state legislatures was defined by the plight of women who were unsafe
in their homes, not by formal family status.

Id. at 194 (quoting ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND
FEMINIST LAWMAKING 23 (2000)).

51. Id. at 193.
52. Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of
Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 335, 370 (1995).
53. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006); CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 1295512955.9 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 216.8-.8A (West
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2501-.2507 (West 2001); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296(2-a) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.501 to -46 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-20 (2004); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
106.50 (West Supp. 2008).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
55. See id.
56. Matthew J. Smith, Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin:
Discriminationin Housing Against UnmarriedCouples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1055, 1056 (1992); Erin P. B. Zasada, Case Comment, Civil Rights-Rights
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housing discrimination laws do not specifically enumerate
unmarried cohabitants as a protected class, the Federal Fair
Housing Act does protect against discrimination based upon
"familial status," 57 and several states have enacted
statutes
58
prohibiting discrimination based upon "marital status."
Although "familial status" and "marital status" could plausibly
apply to one's status as an unmarried cohabitant, many courts have
interpreted these provisions as permitting discrimination against
cohabiting couples. Federal courts have ruled that unmarried
cohabitants are not protected by the Federal Fair Housing Act's
"familial status" provision because the statutory definition of
"familial status" encompasses only domestic settings that include
children,59 and the legislative history clearly expresses that the
provision's focus is not on the marital status of the parties, but on
the existence of a family. 60 The vast majority of state courts have
also refused to recognize unmarried cohabitation as a protected
status under their state's "marital status" provisions.6 ' The
Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, interpreted the state's
"marital status" provision as prohibiting discrimination based upon
an individual's status as either single or married.62 Consequently,
this provision does not prohibit discrimination based upon a

Protectedand DiscriminationProhibited-Living in Sin in North Dakota? Not
Under My Lease, 78 N.D. L. REv. 539, 545 (2002).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
58. See Zasada, supra note 56, at 549 n.85 (indentifying Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the
District of Columbia as having housing laws prohibiting discrimination based
upon marital status).
59. The statutory definition states:
"Familial status" means one or more individuals (who have not attained
the age of 18 years) being domiciled with(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual
or individuals; or
(2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody,
with the written permission of such parent or other person.
The protections afforded against discrimination on the basis of familial
status shall apply to any person who is pregnant or is in the process of
securing legal custody of any individual who has not attained the age of
18 years.
42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2006).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 23 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184 (stating that the committee did not intend the term
"familial status" to include marital status).
61. See Zasada, supra note 56, at 549.
62. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6-8 (Minn. 1990).
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couple's conduct, such as cohabiting outside of marriage. 63 This
interpretation was reinforced by the state's disfavor64of fornication
as expressed by its criminalization of such behavior.
Despite the majority's refusal to protect unmarried cohabitants
from housing discrimination, state courts in Alaska, California, and
Massachusetts have interpreted their state's housing laws as
providing such protection. 65 While interpreting their "marital
status" provisions, each court focused on the statute's plain
66
meaning, rather than on the state's policy regarding fornication.
As a result, these courts concluded that
67 marital status includes
one's status as an unmarried cohabitant.
Additionally, federal courts have interpreted two statutes other
than the Federal Fair Housing Act as providing housing protection
to unmarried cohabitants.68 First, the United States Housing Act of
1937 has been interpreted as providing protection against
discrimination for all families seeking federal public housing,
including unmarried cohabitants. 69 Second, federal courts have also
held that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's protection against
70
discrimination by credit lenders applies to unmarried cohabitants.
Under this federal legislation, credit lenders may not discriminate
against loan applicants based upon their "marital status."'"
Therefore, while most state and federal housing discrimination laws

63. Id. Other states interpreting their housing discrimination law similarly
include Maryland and Wisconsin. See Md. Comm'n on Human Relations v.
Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Md. 1984); County of Dane v.
Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 717-18 (Wis. 1993).
64. Cooper,460 N.W.2d at 7-8.
65. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278
(Alaska 1994); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 381
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Mass. Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989).
66. See Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1201
(Alaska 1989) (focusing on the "ordinary and common meaning" of the statute);
Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (holding that the provision protects unmarried
cohabitants "on its face"); Worcester Hous. Auth., 547 N.E.2d at 44 (finding that
"the plain words of the provisions" are "unambiguous").
67. See Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1201; Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381;
WorcesterHous. Auth., 547 N.E.2d at 45.
68. See Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of
Religion: Tenant's Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22
FORDHAM URB.L.J. 699, 744-45 (1995).
69. See Hann v. Hous. Auth. of Easton, 709 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D. Penn.
1989).
70. See Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2006).
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do not protect unmarried cohabitants, a limited number of statutes
provide unmarried cohabitation a protected status.
II. THE MARITAL PRIVILEGES
The primary goal of the law of evidence is to discover the truth
the
furtherance of justice. 72 Evidentiary privileges, however,
in
oppose this goal by suppressing the truth in certain situations. 73 As
Justice Burger explained, "Testimonial exclusionary rules and
privileges contravene the fundamentalprinciple that 'the public...
has a right to every man's evidence."' Although the law provides
exclusionary rules and privileges in other contexts, the most wellknown privileges are those founded on an existing relationship,
such as the attorney-client, doctor-patient, and psychotherapistpatient relationships. 75 The marital privileges are also relationshipbased privileges, as husbands and wives enjoy two privileges as a
result of their union. First, the spousal testimonial privilege allows
76
spouses to refuse to testify against each other in criminal trials,
and second, the marital communication privilege prevents spouses
communications made between
from testifying about confidential
77
spouses during the marriage.

72. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) ("The fundamental
basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to rest upon
reason-is their adaption to the successful development of the truth."); PAUL C.
GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 37.03 (2003) ("Most ... evidence

rules are designed to enhance the search for truth and thus the fact-finding
process."); Anthony Parsio, Note, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: The
Perils of Recognizing a "DangerousPatient" Exception in Criminal Trials, 41
NEW ENG. L. REV. 623, 623 (2007).

73. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("Whatever their
origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE
UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 865 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining
that evidentiary privileges' "effect in any given trial may be to impede the
search for truth"); JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (5th ed.
1999) (explaining that the effect of privileges "is clearly inhibitive; rather than
facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut out the light").
74. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
75. GIANNELLI, supra note 72, § 37.03 (explaining that the law provides
privileges to "govern[] specified topics such as trade secrets or political votes").
76. See infra Part II.B.
77. See id.
truth.");
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A. The Spousal Testimonial Privilege

The origins of the spousal testimonial privilege date back
centuries. 78 "Writing in 1628, Lord Coke observed that 'it hath
beene resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced
either against or for her husband.' 79 At that time, the wife did not
possess a privilege that could be exercised or waived. 80 Instead, the
law completely denied the wife the ability to testify in a case in
which her husband was a defendant, which meant that the wife
could not testify even if both spouses consented.8 ' This
disqualification of the wife was based on the evidentiary rule that
82
the defendant-husband could not testify on his own behalf.
Because the wife possessed no separate legal existence apart from
her husband, the court viewed her testimony as the equivalent of
her husband's testimony. 83 Therefore, just as the law disqualified
the defendant from testifying on his own behalf, the law also
disqualified the defendant's wife.84 The law has long since
abandoned the doctrines of spousal unity and defendant
disqualification, but the remnants of spousal disqualification are
evident in the modem-day spousal testimonial privilege, 85 which
prevents the court from compelling spouses to testify against each
other.

78. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43-44; Louis W. Hensler, III, The Trammel
Court'sHasty Rejection of Jerry Maguire 's View of Marriage,23 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 325, 329-55 (2006) (providing a detailed history of the spousal testimonial
privilege).
79. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43-44 (quoting 1 E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE
UPON LI=rETON 6b (1628)).
80. Id. at 44 (explaining that the "rule . . . evolved into one of privilege
rather than one of absolute disqualification").
81. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958).
82. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75.
83. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75.
84. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 ("[I]t followed that what was inadmissible
from the lips of the defendant-husband was also inadmissible from his wife.");
Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75 ("Since a defendant was barred as a witness in his own
behalf because of interest, it was quite natural to bar his spouse in view of the
prevailing legal fiction that husband and wife were one person.").
85. Katherine 0. Eldred, Comment, "Every Spouse's Evidence":
Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege in Federal Civil
Trials, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1319, 1322 (2002) (describing the transition from
spousal incompetence to the spousal testimonial privilege); Marc S. Murphy,
Note, Partners in Crime: An Examination of the Privilege Against Adverse
Spousal Testimony, 22 J. FAM. L. 713, 715 (1984) ("The privilege against
adverse spousal testimony is a limited and much maligned descendant of the
historical spousal testimonial disqualification.").
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The primary rationale for the spousal testimonial privilege is
that preventing spouses from testifying against each other
promotes marital harmony.8 6 Without the privilege, marriages
could be damaged beyond repair if spouses were called to
incriminate each other. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
explained, "If [spouses were] permitted [to testify against each
other], it would tend to destroy that bond of mutual confidence and
unquestioning trust that is essential to the peace and happiness of
the most sacred of all domestic relations."8 The privilege, though,
does not extend to all situations in which one spouse may be called
to testify against her partner. First, the privilege applies only to
criminal trials.88 The privilege's rationale suggests that it should
apply in civil as well as criminal cases because adverse spousal
89
testimony can cause marital discord in either context.
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions deny spouses the privilege in civil
suits. 90 Second, the potential testimony must be adverse to the
defendant-spouse. 9 ' Given the privilege's purpose of protecting
marriage from potential disruption, the privilege does not cover
beneficial or neutral testimony because this testimony would pose
no threat to the relationship.92
An additional limitation is that only the witness-spouse may
exercise the spousal testimonial privilege. 93 Originally, both
86. See Mikah K. Story, Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of
the Marital Communications Privilege to Electronic Mail, 58 S.C. L. REv. 275,
278 (2006) ("The rationale for the testimonial privilege is its role in protecting
marital harmony and the sanctity of the marital relationship.").
87. State v. McAuley, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 424, 432-33 (Tenn. 1871).
88. Eldred, supra note 85, at 1320 ("[M]ost courts and commentators
assume that the privilege only applies in federal criminal trials.").
89. See id.at 1346 (suggesting "some extension of the privilege into the
civil context," specifically "a rule allowing spouses to assert the privilege when
governmental actors are a party").
90. R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges after Crawford,
33 Am.J. CRIuM. L. 339, 365 (2006) ("Of the states that still recognize the
adverse testimonial privilege, most apply it to criminal cases only.").
91. In re Martenson, 779 F.2d 461, 463 (8th Cir. 1985) ('[T]he privilege is
not a general one. It must be asserted as to particular questions.' The privilege is
not available unless the anticipated testimony 'would in fact be adverse' to the
nonwitness spouse." (quoting United States v. Smith, 742 F.2d 398, 401 (8th
Cir. 1984))).
92. See United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 396 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding
that the privilege does not apply when a spouse's testimony is "related to
objective facts having no per se effect" on the defendant-spouse and when "no
injury to privilege-protected values," such as the possibility of marital discord,
occurs).
93. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) ("[W]e conclude that
the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a
privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to
testify nor foreclosed from testifying. This modification-vesting the privilege

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

spouses could exercise the privilege and prevent the court from
compelling their testimony.9 The U.S. Supreme Court in Trammel
v. US., however, limited the scope of the privilege so that only the
witness-spouse can elect not to testify. 95 The Court reasoned that if
the witness-spouse is willing to testify, the relationship is already
in disrepair, and the privilege would no longer serve its purpose of
maintaining marital harmony. 96 A final limitation of the spousal
testimonial privilege is that ex-spouses are not protected.97 The
privilege expires upon termination of the marriage because, after
the couple divorces,
no marital relationship exists for the privilege
98
to preserve.

B. The MaritalCommunication Privilege
The marital communication privilege was first recognized in
the 1850s. 99 Prior to that time, spouses were disqualified from
testifying against each other, and the likelihood that marital
communications would be admitted into evidence was small. 100
Yet, when the spousal disqualification was eliminated, the law
recognized the need for a marital communication privilege, a
privilege that prevents the court from compelling evidence of
confidential communications between husband and wife.' 0 1

in the witness-spouse-furthers the important public interest in marital harmony
without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs.").
94. Id.at 46 ("Hawkins, then, left the federal privilege for adverse spousal
testimony where it found it, continuing 'a rule which bars the testimony of one
spouse against the other unless both consent."' (quoting Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958))).
95. Id.at 53.
96. Id. at 52-53.
97. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) ("[D]ivorce removes the
bar of [the spousal testimonial privilege].").
98. Gooden v. Ryan's Rest. Group, Inc., No. 5:04-CV-179-R, 2006 WL
2946313, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 12, 2006).
99. See Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A WitnessCentered Rationale, 14 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 8 (1999); Nissa M. Ricafort, Note,
Jaffe v. Redmond: The Supreme Court'sDramaticShift Supports the Recognition
of a FederalParent-ChildPrivilege,32 IND. L. REv. 259, 261 (1998).
100. See Frost, supra note 99, at 8.
101. For example, the Supreme Court eliminated the spousal disqualification
in federal court in 1933, and one year later the Court explicitly adopted the
marital communication privilege. See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14
(1934) (expressly recognizing the marital communication privilege); Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 386-87 (1933) (eliminating spousal
disqualification).
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Like the spousal testimonial privilege, the marital
communication privilege's rationale is founded on the desire to
promote the marital relationship. Whereas the purpose of the
spousal testimonial privilege is to protect marriages from the
damage and discord that adverse testimony could bring to the
relationship, the purpose of the marital communication privilege is
to promote strong marital relationships by encouraging couples to
share private information. 0 2 "The need for communication
between spouses has long been recognized as a prerequisite for a
successful and lasting relationship."' The marital communication
privilege acknowledges this need and promotes healthy marriages
by assuring that marital confidences are kept within the home.
The marital communication privilege, however, does not
prevent all communications between spouses from being admitted
into evidence. As the Supreme Court explained while affirming the
privilege's place in federal courts, "Communications between the
spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to have been
1 °4
intended to be confidential, and hence they are privileged.
Nonetheless, a party seeking to introduce evidence of
communications between a married couple may rebut this
presumption by showing that the communication was made in the
presence of a third party or by proving some other circumstance
that indicates that the parties did not intend the communication to
be confidential. 10 5 If the husband and wife did not intend
confidentiality, the purpose of the privilege is not served, and the
communication should be admissible.
C. A Closer Look at the Purpose of the MaritalPrivileges
Both state and federal courts infrequently provide detailed
explanations of the marital privileges' purpose. Usually they
merely explain that the privileges foster and protect marriage,
102. STRONG, supra note 73, § 86; Michael W. Mullane, Trammel v. United
States: Bad History,Bad Policy, and BadLaw, 47 ME. L. REV. 105, 132 (1995).
103. Mullane, supra note 102, at 132; see Wolfe, 291 U.S. at 14 (describing
"marital confidences" as "essential to the preservation of the marriage"); David
W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REV. 101, 113 (1956) ("A marriage without the right of
complete privacy of communication would necessarily be an imperfect union.").
104. Wolfe, 291 U.S. at 14.
105. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) ("Although marital
communications are presumed to be confidential, that presumption may be
overcome by proof of facts showing that they were not intended to be private.");
Wolfe, 291 U.S. at 14.
106. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958) ("[T]here is
still a widespread belief, grounded on present conditions, that the law should not
force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further
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but rarely do courts delve further and articulate why the law should
promote marital relationships. For example, in Trammel, the
Supreme Court provided the simple explanation that "[t]he modem
justification for th[e] privilege against adverse spousal testimony is
its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the
marriage relationship."'' 0 7 Inferior courts are also prone to brevity
when expounding upon the marital privileges, as the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York merely explained that
the marital communication privilege's purpose "is to encourage
08
domestic peace[] and the sanctity of the marital relation."'
By failing to articulate the importance of marriage, these
explanations of the martial privileges suggest that marriage should
be protected because of the inherent nature of the relationship.
Indeed, occasionally courts have explicitly explained the marital
privileges as protecting the sacrosanct institution of marriage. The
Supreme Court of Arkansas, for instance, explained that "[t]he
object of the [marital communication privilege] is to prevent
husband or wife [from] impairing the sacredness of confidential
communications between themselves."' 0 9 Likewise, the U.S.
Supreme Court, while disqualifying a wife from testifying

inflame existing domestic differences."); Wolfe, 291 U.S. at 14 ("The basis of
the immunity given to communications between husband and wife is the
protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of
the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration
of justice which the privilege entails."); People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d 43,
55-56 (Mich. 1989) ("The privilege to bar the testimony of a spouse is defended
on the basis that it prevents marital discord . . . . The confidential
communications privilege is said to inspire marital confidences. Over time, case
law has blurred the justifications, and it is sometimes observed that the validity
of both privileges rests on the utilitarian ground of promoting marital
harmony."); State v. Antill, 197 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ohio 1964) ("[T]o promote
marital peace there is a privilege not to disclose in court confidential
communications between husband and wife."); Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272,
276 (Wyo. 1994) ("[T]he primary purpose of the confidential marital
communication privilege is to foster marital relationships .....
107. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
108. In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 191 B.R. 39,49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
109. Hammons v. State, 84 S.W. 718, 720 (Ark. 1905); see Walker v.
Sanbom, 46 Me. 470, 472-73 (Me. 1859) (explaining that the marital
communication privilege "treats all confidential communications ... as sacred,
and not to be divulged in testimony even after death," and that "[i]t regards such
disclosures and such facts as sacred... which cannot be divulged but by express
consent of the other party"); Spearman v. State, 152 S.W. 915, 925 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1912) (Davidson, J., dissenting) ("It has been the policy underlying the
very basic principle of our government, which is the marital relation, that these
communications shall not be disclosed; that these sacred relations incurred by
virtue of the marriage state shall remain inviolable and uncovered.").
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adversely against her husband, stated that "[t]o break down or
impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband
and wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human
existence.""10
This view of the marital privileges as protecting the sacred
institution of marriage comports with society's natural aversion to
interfering in the marital relationship. As one commentator
explained, "All of us have a feeling of indelicacy and want of
decorum in prying into the secrets of husband and wife. It is
important to recognize that this is the real source of the [marital
communication] privilege."'' Similarly, others have elucidated
that "there is a natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to
compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's
condemnation, and to compelling the culprit to the humiliation 112
of
being condemned by the words of his intimate life-partner."
Therefore, the inherent qualities of marriage and society's
reluctance to interfere in the marital relationship partially explain
the purpose of the marital privileges. However, the sacredness of
the relationship does not provide a full explanation of the
importance that the law places on marriage.
Although cases specifically dealing with the marital privileges
tend to provide unsatisfactory explanations of marriage's
privileged status, in recent years, the law's interest in marriage has
been explained in cases concerning the recognition of same-sex
marriage. In this context, states defending their ban on same-sex
unions and courts rendering judgments in cases challenging the
traditional definition of marriage have explained the importance of
110. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839); see State v. Taylor, 515
P.2d 695, 703 (Mont. 1973) (explaining that the purpose of the spousal
testimonial privilege is "the protection of the sanctity of marriage and the
home"); Commonwealth v. McBurrows, 779 A.2d 509, 520-21 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001) (explaining that the spousal testimonial privilege protects "the great
principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife" and prevents the
"destr[uction] [of] the best solace of human existence").
111.

CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 90,

at 179 (1st ed. 1954); see S.E.C. v. Lavin, 937 F. Supp. 23, 30 (D.D.C. 1996)
(explaining that the marital communication privilege recognizes that "society
has an aversion to straying too far into the sanctity of the marital haven"); In re
Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (D. Nev. 1983) (explaining that "compelling
disclosure of communications between husband and wife" may be "repugnant").
112. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2228, at 756 (2d ed. 1923)
(emphasis omitted); see G-Fours, Inc. v. Miele, 496 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir.
1974) (describing "the natural repugnance to depriving a man of his liberty
because of the compelled testimony of his spouse"); United States v. Leach, 22
C.M.R. 178, 190 (C.M.A. 1956) (explaining that a rationale "for granting a
witness-spouse the privilege to refuse to testify is... the natural repugnancy to
making the wife the instrument through which the husband is condemned").
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the marital relationship primarily as providing the best
circumstances for procreation and childrearing." 3 Washington's
ban on same-sex marriage faced one of the earliest challenges of a
state's definition of marriage as a union between a man and a
woman."14 While upholding the state's ban on same-sex marriage
in Singer v. Hara, the Court of Appeals of Washington held that
the state's distinction between heterosexual and homosexual
couples in granting marriage licenses was not based on
discrimination, but was instead founded "upon the state's
recognition that our society as a whole views marriage as the
appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of
children."'' 15 The court further explained that "[t]he fact remains
that marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily
because of societal values associated with the propagation of the
human race"" 6 and that "marriage is . . . clearly related to the
public interest in affording a favorable environment for the growth
of children."' 17 Since Singer was decided in 1974, courts and states
have continually argued that8 marriage is the ideal setting for
procreation and childrearing. 1
Even in Massachusetts, one of the few states to provide
homosexual couples an opportunity to marry, 1 9 the importance of
marriage in the upbringing of children played a part in the decision
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to recognize samesex marriage. The state presented the traditional rationale that
"confining marriage to opposite-sex couples ensures that children
are raised in the 'optimal' setting." 120 However, the court
recognized that in today's world many same-sex couples support
113. William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AvE MARIA L.
REv. 153, 164-65 (2004).
114. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
115. Id. at 1195.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 1197.
118. See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d
451, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App, 2003) ("The State contends it has a legitimate interest
in encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the stable environment
traditionally associated with marriage, and that limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples is rationally related to that interest."); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 73
n.8 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting) (expressing the opinion that the purpose
of the State's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples "is to promote and
protect propagation"); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005) ("[O]ur society considers marriage between a man and woman to
play a vital role in propagating the species and in providing the ideal
environment for raising children.").
119. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
120. Id. at 962.
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and raise children.' 21 The court reasoned that "[e]xcluding samesex couples from civil marriage will not make children of oppositesex marriages more secure, but it does prevent children of samesex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow
from the assurance of 'a stable family structure
in which children
22
will be reared, educated, and socialized.""
These same-sex marriage cases suggest that one of the law's
primary interests in protecting the institution of marriage is the
growth and development of children. A closer look at some of the
cases involving the marital privileges confirms that part of the
policy behind the privileges is the benefit that the preservation of the
marriage provides the children of the relationship. As far back as the
eighteenth century, English courts explained that the marital
privileges protect not only the marriage, but also the family.123 This
distinction between fostering the marriage and protecting the family
is also found in nineteenth-century American case law. For example,
in a case concerning confidential marital communications, the
Supreme Court of Florida explained that "[s]ociety has a deeplyrooted interest in the preservation of the peace of families, and in the
maintenance of the sacred institution of marriage" and that the
marital privileges are founded upon the "public policy that seeks to
preserve inviolate the peace, good order, and limitless confidence
between the heads of the family circle.' 24 The court could have
explained the privileges solely as protecting marriages, but it instead
explicitly distinguished between the preservation of marriage and
the protection of families.
Continuing into the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court
has explicitly explained that the privileges are designed to benefit
not only the parties of the marriage, but also the children of the
relationship. In Hawkins v. UnitedStates, the Court stated that "[t]he
basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband. . . [is]
a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not
121. Id. at 963.
122. Id. at 964 (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting)).
123. Barker v. Dixie, (1736) 95 Eng. Rep. 171, 171 (K.B.) ("The reason why
the law will not suffer a wife to be a witness for or against her husband is to
preserve the peace of families."); Sir John Fenwick's Trial in the House of

Commons, 13 How. St. Tr. 582 (1696) ("The actions of a wife cannot be
evidence for nor against her husband [because of] the danger [that] might follow

in cases of matrimony and families.").

124. Mercer v. State, 24 So. 154, 157 (Fla. 1898); see McCormick v. State,
186 S.W. 95, 97 (Tenn. 1916) ("Sound public policy requires that neither the
husband nor the wife shall be permitted to testify, in criminal cases, as to any
matter coming to his or her knowledge by reason of the marital relation. The
sacredness of the home and the peace of families can only be preserved and
protected by enforcing this long-established rule of the common law.").
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only for the benefit of the husband [and] wife [but also for the]
children. 1, 25 Similarly, in Trammel, the Court explained that the
marital privileges not only "affect marriage," but also the "home,
and [other] family relationships. ' 126 In sum, although the rationale
for the law's preservation of marriage through evidentiary
privileges is unclear at times, case law pertaining not only to the
marital privileges but also to the recognition of same-sex marriage
suggests that a principal justification for this protection is the well
being of the children of the relationship. As one commentator
explained, the marital privileges protect 1marriage,
but they "also
27
benefit" the "children of married couples.
III. RECOGNIZING A COHABITING-PARENT PRIVILEGE

Safeguarding children from the harm of parental separation
provides a major justification of the marital privileges' protection
of marriage. Marriage, however, is not the only context in which
children develop. Large numbers of unmarried cohabitants
procreate and raise children. Denying these couples the protection
of evidentiary privileges exposes the children of these relationships
to the harms against which the marital privileges were designed to
protect. A cohabiting-parent privilege would provide children of
unmarried cohabitants the same protection that the marital
privileges provide children produced inside marriage. Furthermore,
while the primary rationale for not extending legal benefits to
unmarried cohabitants is that doing so would undermine marriage,
this argument is not applicable to a cohabiting-parent privilege
because the privilege would not reduce a couple's incentive to
marry.

125. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958). Courts have
repeatedly echoed this explanation of the marital privileges. See United States v.
Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d
1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360, 1364 (7th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Winfree, 170 F. Supp. 659, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1959);
State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Mo. 1979).
126. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980). Other courts have
cited this language while describing the marital privileges. See United States v.
Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1338 (4th Cir. 1993); A.B. v. United States, 24 F. Supp.
2d 488, 490 (D. Md. 1988); Jurcoane v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483,
493 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
127. Maria A. La Vita, Note, When the Honeymoon is Over: How a Federal
Court'sDenial of the Spousal Privilege to a Legally MarriedSame-Sex Couple
Can Result in the Incarcerationof a Spouse Who Refuses to Adversely Testify,
33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 243, 248 (2007).
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A. ProtectingChildren of UnmarriedCohabitants
Despite the legal protections afforded the marital relationship
and the characterization of marriage as the ideal setting for
childrearing, unmarried cohabitants have not been deterred from
raising children. 128 In fact, unmarried cohabitants are statistically
likely to have children.' 29 Census data confirms the prevalence of
children bom into homes consisting of unmarried cohabitants, as
the 2000 census showed that 4.1 million children lived in
cohabitating households. 130 Of these children, about half were the
biological children of both cohabitants.' 3 ' An earlier study found
that in the early 1990s, twelve percent of the children born in the
U.S. were conceived by parents who were unmarried and
cohabiting. 132 As the number of couples choosing to cohabitate
continues to rise, it seems reasonable to assume that the number of
children born to unmarried cohabitants will also continue to
increase.
1. The Effects of ParentalSeparation
Whether a child's parents are married or simply cohabiting,
parental conflict and separation can negatively affect the child.l3
The effects of parental separation on children can be wide-ranging,
"[b]ut many children are worse off when their parents divorce or
separate as far as the 'three
134 e's' of their existence--economics,
emotions, and education.'

The dissolution of the parental relationship can have a
significant negative economic impact on the child. When parents
separate, children find themselves in single-parent households,
usually with substantially fewer economic resources to provide for

128. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of
Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2007) (explaining that
one's legal status likely plays no part in the decision to raise a child).
129. Id.
130. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHILDREN AND THE HOUSEHOLDS THEY LIvE IN:
2000, at 9 (2004).
131. Bowman, supra note 128, at 32.
132. Wendy D. Manning, Cohabitation and Child Well-Being, GENDER
ISSUES, July 2006, at 21, 23.
133. Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the
Unified Family Court: A Public Health Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 95, 100
(1998) [hereinafter Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs]
("[D]ivorce by married parents and separation by unmarried parents are .
[both] possible conflict-generating events.").
134. Id.at 104.
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their needs. 135 Studies have found that upon the separation of their
parents, children face up to a thirty percent reduction in their
standard of living.1 36 This negative economic impact affects not
only children enduring divorce, but also children of separated
unmarried parents because cohabiting adults form economic
relationships similar to married couples.' 37 "As a result, the
dissolution of cohabiting unions has an impact upon the economic
welfare of women and children comparable to that of divorce,
leaving a substantial number of former cohabitants [and their
children] in poverty."' 138 In fact, children of unmarried cohabitants
may typically experience more severe economic disadvantages
after parental separation than children of divorced parents because
unmarried fathers 3§enerally pay child support less frequently than
divorced fathers. 1 Even in upper and middle-class families, in
which parental separation does not force parents and children into
poverty, dissolution of the parental relationship can negatively
affect the child, as "children are often economically disadvantaged,
particularly 140with regard to [the] ability to pay for higher
education.'
Children may also experience severe emotional and
psychological consequences from the separation of their parents.
For instance, "[m]any [children] describe the date of their parents'
physical separation as the saddest of their lives. Parental divorce or
separation can generate simultaneous feelings of grief, guilt,
uncertainty, rage, and hopelessness, powerful emotions that forever
shape a child's view of the world."' 14 ' The psychological and
emotional effects of parental separation can continue throughout
the child's development. For example, parental separation often
results in the diminishment of the relationship between the child
and one of the biological parents, typically the father. 14 2 Lack of a

135. Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.: A Preliminary Report and a
Model Statute on an InterdisciplinaryEducationalProgramfor Divorcing and
Separating Parents,27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131, 141-42 (1993) [hereinafter
Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.].
136. Schepard, ParentalConflict Prevention Programs,supra note 133, at 104.
137. Bowman, supranote 128, at 25-26.
138. Id.
139. Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal Marriage: Inevitable or
Reversible?, 41 FAM. L.Q. 491,496-97 (2007).
140. John F. Coverdale, Missing Persons: Children in the Tax Treatment of
Marriage,48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 475, 481 (1998).
141. Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs, supra note 133, at
104-05.
142. See Coverdale, supra note 140, at 479 ("In 1994, only 69% of children
under age eighteen were living with two parents. 23% were living with their
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relationship with their fathers has been linked to negative
psychological effects in both boys and girls.' 43 This problem is
particularly prevalent in families consisting of unmarried
cohabitants, as unmarried fathers typically maintain less contact
with their children after parental separation than divorced
fathers. 144
The absence of a parent from the home also generally results 1in
45
less investment in the child's educational development.
Consequently, parental separation and development within a
single-parent home can produce serious educational disadvantages
for the child. For instance, "[c]hildren living with both their
biological parents [are] about half as likely to . . . repeat[] a grade
' 46
in school compared with children in all other types of families.'
Studies also have shown that children reared by single-parent
households and step-families "d[o] worse on standardized tests,
ha[ve] lower grade point averages, attend[] school less regularly,
and ha[ve] lower expectations about going to college than students
from intact families after adjusting for race, sex, mother's
education, father's education, number of siblings and place of
residence.' 4 7
Regardless of which familial setting is ideal for childrearing,
children benefit from having their parents remain in a committed
relationship. Children of unmarried cohabitants suffer much the
same harm from parental separation as children of married couples.
Indeed, children of unmarried cohabitants may experience more
severe harms than children of divorced parents because unmarried
fathers typically pay less child support and maintain less contact
with their children than divorced fathers. 148 Therefore, by denying
evidentiary privileges to unmarried cohabiting parents, the law
runs the risk not only of breaking up a relationship between the

mother but not their father, 4% with their father but not their mother, and 4%
with neither parent.").
143. Id.at 487-88 ("Early grade school boys who have little contact with
their fathers in preschool years are generally less assertive and more dependent
on their peers, and are more likely to shy away from physical and competitive
activities. This contributes to their 'unhappiness, loneliness, and sense of
alienation.' Middle-school boys whose fathers are absent have less sense of
masculinity and poorer interpersonal relations. Among adolescent girls, a lack of
closeness to their fathers is associated with depressive and anxious moods, poor
general adjustment, and negative body image.").
144. Garrison, supra note 139, at 496-97.
145. Coverdale, supra note 140, at 481.
146. Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E., supra note 135, at 143.
147. Coverdale, supra note 140, at 491.
148. See supra notes 139, 144 and accompanying text.
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mother and father, but also of causing tremendous harm to the
children of that relationship.
2. The Instability of UnmarriedCohabitation
Not only do children of unmarried cohabitants suffer greatly
from parental separation-perhaps even more so than children of
divorced parents-but they are also particularly susceptible to
these harms because of the instability of cohabiting relationships.
Studies confirm that martial relationships typically last longer than
relationships between unmarried cohabitants. While on average
first marriages last eight years, 14 9 the average duration of a
relationship between unmarried cohabitants is only eighteen
months.150 Indeed, forty percent of unmarried cohabitants end their
relationship within one year, while only ten percent of these
relationships last longer than five years. 15 ' This instability
unquestionably affects children because "children born to
cohabiting parents are two to four times more likely to experience
their parents' separation than are children born to married
parents." 52 Therefore, because children of unmarried cohabitants
are more likely not only to experience parental separation, but also
to suffer greater harm when their parents do separate, these
children are particularly in need of the protections of evidentiary
privileges, perhaps even more so than children of married couples.
As one commentator argued, "[D]ata comparing cohabiting unions
to marriages-showing that they are in the aggregate shorter, less
stable . . . and typically not as good a setting for children-are in
fact strong arguments in favor of extending, rather than
1 53 denying,
legal protections for the parties to these arrangements."
3. ProtectingChildren of Same-Sex Couples
A cohabiting-parent privilege would not only protect children
of couples who choose not to marry, but would also provide
protection to a class of children whose parents generally are unable
to marry. Though homosexuals have fought extensively for the
right to marry, same-sex couples are able to marry in only a
handful of states and are able to enter into civil unions or domestic
149. Bowman, supra note 128, at 19 n.1 12.
150. Garrison, supra note 139, at 491.
151. Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, National Estimates of
Cohabitation,26 DEMOGRAPHY 615, 620 (1989).
152. Garrison, supra note 139, at491.
153. Bowman, supra note 128, at 2.
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partnerships in a limited number of others.1 54 As a result, while the
marital privileges will protect children of heterosexual, unmarried
cohabitants if their parents decide to marry, most children adopted
by same-sex couples can never enjoy the benefits of the marital
privileges.
In the landmark case of Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized the
right of homosexual couples to marry. 155 A few states, such as
Connecticut and Iowa, currently go as far as Massachusetts and
allow same-sex couples to marry. 156 Nevertheless, some states
have recognized other types of unions that provide couples some of
the legal consequences of marriage. For example, New Jersey
allows same-sex couples to enter into civil unions that bestow the
couples with all of the legal benefits of marriage. 57 Other states
permit same-sex couples to enter into domestic partnerships, which
provide the couples legal benefits that vary from state to state. For
example, Oregon and Washington provide couples with nearly all
of the consequences of marriage under their domesticpartnership
laws, including the benefit of the marital privileges. Yet, other
states that have enacted domestic partnership laws have not
extended the protections of the marital privileges to these
couples. 159

Although the majority of states prohibit same-sex couples from
marrying or entering into other legally recognized unions that
provide the protection of the marital privileges, these couples
generally are allowed to adopt children. Only Mississip
*
"expressly prohibit[s] homosexuals from adopting children. ' ' r °
154. See infra notes 155, 157 and accompanying text.
155. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
156. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008);
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
157. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31a (West Supp. 2008).
158. See OR. REV. STAT. tit. 11, ch. 106, § 107.005 (Supp. 2008); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009).
159. Maine and the District of Columbia have enacted domestic partnerships
laws that do not provide the benefits of the marital privileges. See D.C. CODE §
32-701 to -710 (2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2008)
(creating a domestic partnership registry); ME. R. EVID. 504 (providing only
husbands and wives the benefits of the privileges). Additionally, Hawaii allows
same-sex couples to enter into reciprocal beneficiary agreements that do not
include the benefits of the marital privileges. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §
572C-6 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2007) ("Unless otherwise expressly provided
by law, reciprocal beneficiaries shall not have the same rights and obligations
under the law that are conferred through marriage . . . ."); HAw. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 626-1, R. 505 (LexisNexis 2007) (extending the scope of the marital
privileges only to spouses).
160. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW:
DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 629 (3d ed. 2007); see MISS. CODE ANN. §
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Additionally, Utah's adoption laws effectively prevent homosexual
couples from adopting because adoption is available only to legally
married couples or single persons not living in a cohabiting
relationship. r6 However, "only [e]leven states and the District of
Columbia, either by statute or findings by their hiest courts,
specifically permit adoption by gays and lesbians.
Inthe states
that do not expressly allow children to be placed in same-sex
households, an adoption petition filed by a homosexual couple is
judged on an individual
63 basis by a court seeking to further the best
interests of the child. 1
Despite their inability to marry, in those states in which samesex adoption is permitted, homosexual couples do adopt. A recent
study found that forty percent of both private and public adoption
agencies have placed children with same-sex couples and that sixty
percent of agencies will at least accept applications from
homosexual couples. 164 These numbers are likely underreported, as
most agencies do not keep records of applicants' sexual
orientations. 65 Furthermore, the 2000 census found that over 1.5
million children were being reared by adoptive parents.' 66 The
Census Bureau does not keep records on the number of adopted
children being reared by same-sex couples, but a recent
demographic study estimates that one percent of all adoptees, or
roughly 15,000 children, are reared by homosexual adoptive

93-17-3(5) (West 2007) ("Adoption by couples of the same gender is
prohibited."). A Florida court recently overturned a state statute similar to
Mississippi's statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005 & Supp.
2009) ("No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is
a homosexual."); Taylor Gandossy, Judge Overturns FloridaBan on Adoption
by Gays, CNN, Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/US/i 1/25/florida.gay.adoption/index.html.
161. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
162. EvAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., EXPANDING RESOURCES FOR
CHILDREN: IS ADOPTION BY GAYS AND LESBIANS PART OF THE ANSWER FOR
Boys AND GIRLS WHO NEED HOMES? 10 n.10 (2006) (reporting that "California,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey and New York . . .expressly
permit gay and lesbian adults to adopt" and that "Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana,
Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington D.C. have statutes or appellate court
decisions prohibiting discrimination.. . of adoption by the same sex partner of a
parent").
163. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 160, at 629.
164.

EvAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supra note 162, at 11 (reporting

further that "some [agencies] actively reach out to [same-sex couples]").
165. Id.
166. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN: 2000,
at 2, tbl.1 (2003).
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parents.167 These statistics indicate that "opportunities for gay men
and lesbians to become parents through adoption" are "readily
available"1' 68 and that many same-sex couples are indeed taking
advantage of these opportunities.
Although the number of children adopted by same-sex couples
may seem relatively small, these children are susceptible to the
negative effects of parental separation to the same extent as
children of heterosexual couples, and they are equally as worthy of
the protection that evidentiary privileges can provide.
Unfortunately, these children cannot enjoy the benefits of the
marital privileges because even if their parents wanted to marry,
they cannot do so. Therefore, a cohabiting-parent privilege would
fill the void left by the nearly universal ban on same-sex marriage
and would provide the same protection from parental separation
that children of married couples enjoy.
A cohabiting-parent privilege would also provide children of
same-sex couples an additional means of protection against the
effects of parental separation. "The inability to marry is a badge of
inferiority and validates discrimination against and disapproval" of
same-sex couples. 169 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
acknowledged this effect while recognizing the right of
homosexual couples to marry: "The marriage ban works a deep
and scarring hardshipon a very real segment of the community for
no rational reason."
Studies have shown that the stigmatization
and discrimination faced by same-sex couples cause stress and
other negative mental effects that can strain the couple's
167. GARY J. GATES ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., ADOPTION AND FOSTER
CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2007).
168. EvAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supranote 162, at 12.

169. Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and
Supporters of Same-Sex MarriageBoth Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV.
573, 593 (2005); see Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich & Galit Moskowitz, In the
Interest of Children of Same-Sex Couples, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW.
255, 264 (2005) ("If same-sex couples are denied the right to marry, they are
treated as second-class citizens based entirely on sexual orientation. The
differentiation of same-sex couples perpetuates a stigma attached to
homosexuality that has negative effects on committed homosexual couples and
their children."); Katherine M. Forbes, Note, Time for a New Privilege:
Allowing Unmarried Cohabitating Couples to Claim the Spousal Testimony
Privilege, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 887, 903 (2007) (explaining that the inability
of homosexual couples to marry "sends the message that their relationships,
unlike relationships between heterosexuals who can procreate naturally, are not
worth protecting").
170. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003);
see also Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(Collester, J., dissenting) ("By prohibiting [same-sex couples] from a real right
to marry, [they] as well as their children suffer the real consequences of being
'different."'), aff'd as modified by 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
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commitment to each other and that may ultimately lead to the
dissolution of the relationship. 17 1 If same-sex parents separate as a
result of this stigma, the adopted child is exposed to the potentially
severe consequences of parental separation. 172 The cohabitingparent privilege would protect the child from the effects of parental
separation by not only providing the safeguards of evidentiary
privileges, but by also potentially alleviating some of the stigma
faced by same-sex couples. By applying equally to both
heterosexual and homosexual couples, a cohabiting-parent
privilege would signal that same-sex relationships deserve
protection and are worthy of greater societal respect. 173 This
greater respect could lead to less conflict between same-sex
couples and consequently fewer children suffering the negative
effects of parental separation.
4. The Cohabiting-ParentPrivilege Would Not Endanger
Children
Some may argue that a privilege for cohabiting parents could
harm rather than protect children. If an adult remains in the child's
home because the invocation of the cohabiting-parent privilege
resulted in the acquittal of the defendant-spouse, the argument
would follow that the child could be harmed because the adult
might be a negative and potentially dangerous presence in the
child's life. However, in the most dangerous scenarios the
cohabiting-parent privilege, like the marital privileges, would be
unavailable. In most jurisdictions, a spouse can invoke neither the
spousal testimonial privilege nor the marital communication
privilege if the defendant-spouse is accused of harming a child or
171. See Michael G. Dudley et al., Same-Sex Couples' Experiences with
Homonegativity, J. GLBT FAM. STUD., Sept. 2005, at 75 ("[T]he stigma attached
to gay and lesbians in general and to same-sex couples in particular compounds
the normal stresses experienced by any two people involved in forming and
maintaining a committed relationship."); Melanie D. Otis et al., Stress and
Relationship Quality in Same-Sex Couples, 23 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS
81, 85 (2006) ("Compounding the effects of minority stress, individuals tend to
carry the effects of discrimination with them to other spheres of their lives,
where those effects have negative consequences on a variety of relationships.
Intimate relationships are particularly at risk.").
172. See supra Part III.A. 1.
173. Recognition of same-sex marriage certainly would provide a stronger
signal that same-sex relationships are worthy of societal respect. See F. H.
Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REv. 561, 580 (2001). The point is merely that bestowing the protections
of evidentiary privileges to some same-sex couples may reduce the stigma
(perhaps only to a small degree) associated with homosexual relationships.

2010]

PRIVILEGES & COHABITING PARENTS

779

the witness-spouse.' 74 Even if the witness does not want to testify,
the court can compel her testimony over her objection."'
Similarly, the cohabiting-parent privilege would be unavailable in
situations in which the defendant-cohabitant had shown aggression
toward the child or the other parent. Therefore, in the most
dangerous situations the privilege would not cause a negative
presence to remain in the child's home.
Even if the defendant-cohabitant is not accused of harming the
child or the other cohabitant, the privilege might not be invoked.
Only the witness holds the spousal testimonial privilege; thus, the
defendant-spouse cannot choose to exercise the privilege. 176 If the
1 77
witness wishes to testify against her spouse, she may do so.
Likewise, under the cohabiting-parent privilege, the witnesscohabitant would have the option of invoking or waiving the
testimonial privilege. If the witness-cohabitant determines that
waiving the privilege is in the best interest of her child and the rest
of her family, she may testify. If she determines that testifying
would be detrimental to herself or her child, she may invoke the
privilege. Hence, the witness-spouse has the power to decide what
is best for her child. This decision should not be questioned
because parents have the constitutional right to raise their children
as they see fit,' 78 and the law presumes that a fit parent acts in the
best interests of her child. 7 9
In sum, the cohabiting-parent privilege likely would not harm
the child. In the most dangerous situations, the cohabiting-parent
privilege would be unavailable, and in all other scenarios the
witness spouse could waive the testimonial privilege if doing so
would be in the child's best interests. However, the cohabitingparent privilege could raise a concern when the confidential
communication privilege is available and the defendant-spouse is
174. See United States v. Babe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing the crimes against children exception and explaining that "[s]ome
states have established a broad exception to the privilege when one spouse is
accused of abusing any child" and "[o]ther states have adopted a narrower
exception, applicable only to crimes against children of either spouse"); Malinda
L. Seymore, Isn 't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and
Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032, 1050-51 (1996) (providing a history
of the exception); Pamela A. Haun, Note, The Marital Privilege in the TwentyFirst Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 137, 163-64 (2001).

175. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530 (1960).
176. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
177. Id.
178. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.").
179. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000) ("There is a presumption
that fit parents act in their children's best interests.").
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not accused of harming the child or the child's other parent. In
contrast to the spousal testimonial privilege, both the defendantspouse and the witness spouse hold the marital communication
privilege. 180 Therefore, both spouses must agree to waive the
privilege. 181 Likewise, the defendant-cohabitant can invoke the
confidential communication privilege for cohabiting parents even
if the witness-spouse determines it is in the best interests of the
child for her to reveal the confidential communications. Even in
this scenario, though, the potential for harm to the child is small
because the defendant-cohabitant has not threatened the child or
the child's other parent, and if the witness-spouse ultimately
determines that the child is endangered by remaining in the
defendant's home, she can move out and remove the child from the
dangerous situation.
B. The Cohabiting-ParentPrivilege Would Not Undermine
Marriage
Based upon the belief that marriage is the ideal setting for
procreation and childrearing, states have provided marriage
extensive legal benefits. On the other hand, unmarried cohabitants
have been denied these benefits based upon the reasoning that,
because of society's strong interests in marriage, the law should
foster and protect only the marital relationship. In other words,
because "various family forms are not 'equally successful in
accomplishing the family's important care giving, teaching, and
socializing functions, . . . society has an interest in preferring and
encouraging those that work best."" 82 Thus, married couples are
afforded legal benefits in order to incentivize marriage and to
discourage unmarried cohabitation because the law has deemed
marriage the ideal family structure. 183 As one scholar argues,
"[T]he commitments inherent in formal families . . . increase the
likelihood of stability and continuity for children. Those factors are
so essential to child development that they alone may justify the
legal incentives and preferences traditionally given to permanent
180. United States v. Babe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1442 (10th Cir. 1997).
181. See id.
182. Duncan, supra note 113, at 164-65 (quoting Eric G. Andersen,
Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal Standards,
1998 BYU L. REV. 935, 946 (1998)).
183. Bowman, supra note 128, at 2 ("Recent articles about cohabitation have
argued simply that the institution of marriage is better than cohabitation for both
the couple and their children, and the law should therefore be structured so as to
discourage this conduct, because to give legal protections to cohabitants will
harm the institution of marriage.").
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kinship units based on marriage."'' 14 Likewise, "[t]he same factors
can justify the denial of legal protection to unstable social
patterns
85
that threaten children's developmental environment."'
Marriage is a more stable family unit than unmarried
cohabitation. However, even if this instability provides adequate
justification to withhold most of the benefits of marriage from
unmarried cohabitants, it does not justify withholding the
protection of evidentiary privileges from cohabiting parents and
their children. Evidentiary privileges are unique from other
benefits of marriage. Most consequences of marriage can be seen
as benefits that make the relationship attractive and, therefore,
provide incentives for couples to marry. For example, married
couples are provided a favorable tax status as a result of their
marital union. 186 This preferential tax status and its resulting
economic benefit can be viewed as an inducement for couples to
marry. In contrast, the marital privileges are not designed to
encourage couples to enter into marriage but are instead intended
to foster the continuation of the relationship once the marriage has
commenced. Therefore, for most couples the privileges only
weakly incentivize marriage.
1. The MaritalPrivilegesAre Weak Incentives to Marry
Unlike the marital tax advantages, an average couple likely
would not think of the protections that the marital privileges
184. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and
Sexual Privacy--Balancingthe Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 463,475-76 (1983).
185. Id. at 476; see also Garrison, supra note 139, at 500-01 ("As family
sociologist Paul Amato has put it, 'the evidence consistently indicates that
children with two happily and securely married parents have a statistical
advantage over children raised in other family groups.' And '[b]ecause we all
have an interest in the well-being of children, it is reasonable for social
institutions (such as the state) to attempt to increase the proportion of children
raised by married parents with satisfying and stable marriages.' In sum, formal
marriage is associated with a wide range of public and private benefits. These
benefits support public policies designed to encourage formal registration of
marital intentions and childbearing within formalized relationships." (quoting
Paul Amato, Tension Between Institutional and Individual Views of Marriage,
66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 959, 962-63 (2004))).
186.
Married taxpayers are generally permitted to file joint returns ....
Although married couples . . . file separately, the rate tables are
structured so that separate filing almost always results in increased tax
liability ....Joint filing allows a married couple to split... their total
income and obtain the benefit of lower marginal tax rates.
Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriage
from the Perspectiveofa Child ofthe Union, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 411, 437 (1999).
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provide as incentives to marry. It is odd to think that the ability to
refrain from testifying against a spouse at a criminal trial would
induce anyone to marry. For such an incentive to work, a potential
husband or wife would have to think, "My significant other might
be charged with a crime, and I might be called to testify.
Therefore, it would be a good idea to marry so that I will not have
to incriminate my spouse." When contemplating marriage, it is
unlikely that anyone would think about the potential of testifying
against a spouse or the possibility of revealing confidential
communications. 187 As one scholar remarked, "The decision to
marry is based on a myriad of factors; it is hard to believe
that the
'' 88
marital privileges could ever play a significant role."
The marital privileges likely are not considered in a couple's
decision to marry for several reasons. First, the potential incentive
to marry provided by the marital privileges is difficult to quantify.
Incentives are most effective "in situations when information about
their calculation and allocation can be disseminated."' 189 For
instance, consider the incentive to marry provided by a preferential
tax status. A couple can do a few calculations or visit an
accountant and easily determine the amount of economic benefit
they will gain through marriage. The extra dollars resulting from
the preferential tax status provide an effective incentive to marry
because the couple can easily attach a value to the reward they
receive by marrying. In contrast, benefits that are difficult to value
serve as poor incentives because the targets of the incentives do
not know the precise nature of the reward they stand to receive by
altering their behavior. Unlike the concrete economic benefit of a
preferential tax status, the benefits of the martial privileges are
intangible and not easily quantifiable. What is the value of the
ability to refuse to testify against a significant other or to refuse to
reveal confidential marital communications? Most people,
especially those who are in relationships with law-abiding partners
or who have never been called to testify at trial, will have a
difficult time assigning a value to these benefits. Consequently, the
marital privileges are weak incentives to marry because potential
spouses cannot easily quantify the reward they stand to gain by
marrying.
187. See Bowman, supra note 128, at 2 ("[F]ew people even know, much
less are influenced by, their legal rights when making decisions about intimate
relationships . ... ).
188. Frost, supranote 99, at 18.
189. Elleta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get
Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37
VILL. L. REv. 273, 298 (1992).
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Second, not only are the advantages of the marital privileges
not easily quantifiable, but they also are speculative. An incentive
is most effective when there is a clear "link" between the "reward"
and "the conduct sought to be induced."' 190 A preferential tax status
is an effective incentive because once a couple marries they will
immediately receive the benefit of the tax advantage. In other
words, the link between marriage and saved tax dollars is clear and
certain. In contrast, the link between marriage and the benefits of
the marital privileges is not as clear because realization of the
benefit is dependent on more than mere marital status. To obtain
the benefit of the spousal testimonial privilege, one spouse must be
charged with a crime, and the other spouse must be called to
testify. 191 Likewise, to realize the benefit of the marital
communication privilege, a spouse must be called as a witness in a
case where private marital communications could be of evidentiary
value.' 9 2 These two situations are scenarios that most couples
would assume are unlikely to occur, and, indeed, relatively few
married couples are ever in the position to exercise these
privileges. 93 As a result, the marital privileges are weak incentives
to marry because the link between the rewards of the evidentiary
privileges and a couple's decision to marry is so attenuated.
Finally, evidentiary privileges are ineffective incentives to
marry because few couples are aware of them. As far back as 1929,
scholars noted the lack of public knowledge of the marital
privileges.' 94 One law review article commented that "one may
seriously doubt that the law of evidence ha[s] any formative effect
on family life in general. Too few people get into court, and the
adjective law is little known outside of it."
Four decades later,
the advisory committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence also
recognized the general public ignorance of the marital
privileges. 196 Although there is some suggestion that public
190. Id. at 297.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See supra Part II.B.
193. See Frost, supra note 99, at 16 ("[Clourts assume that the testimonial
privileges foster the formation of all covered relationships, of which only a
small percentage will ever be involved in litigation."); Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed
FederalRules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 92 (1973) ("For in protecting those
relatively few confidential utterances that do bear upon concrete litigation, the
law protects all those that may.").
194. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the
Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675, 682 (1929).
195. Id. at 677.
196. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 183, 246
(1973) (FED. R. EviD. 505(a) advisory committee reporting that "in all likelihood"
couples are "unaware" of the "privilege for martial communications").
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197
awareness of the marital privileges has increased in recent years,
the general notion persists that "those outside the legal profession
[rarely] know the rules regarding marital privilege." r98 Even if the
level of public awareness is uncertain, "it is logical to assume" that
the marital privileges enjoy a relatively low level of public
awareness when compared to other privileges, such as the doctorpatient privilege or the attorney-client privilege. 199 Doctors and
attorneys have incentives to publicize the privileges that patients
and clients enjoy "because [those privileges] make[] their services
more attractive to the general public. ' N On the other hand, the
marital privileges lack an advocate who is incentivized to increase
the general awareness of the privileges. As a result, "married
couples only come to learn of the privilege after one member of the
20 1
couple is involved in litigation and the other is called to testify.
The marital privileges, "therefore, benefit[] only the minority of
marital relationships in which
one spouse has independent
202
knowledge of the privilege."
An incentive is effective in altering behavior only if the
targeted individuals are aware of the benefit they stand to gain. For
the marital privileges to be effective inducements to marry, couples
must be aware of the benefits they could receive from the
privileges. 20 3 A couple will not consider the marital privileges
when making the decision to marry if they know nothing of them,
and, indeed, the general public awareness of the marital privileges
and the rules that govern them is at best questionable. On the
whole, the marital privileges are weak incentives to marry because
they are unquantifiable, speculative, and unknown. Thus, an
ordinary couple likely will never consider the marital privileges
when deciding to marry. If the marital privileges do not incentivize
marriage, providing some unmarried couples with similar

197. See Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical
Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital
Privileges, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1374 (1973) ("[T]he media, especially
television, lead to increased public awareness of legal concepts such as
privileges.").
198. Renee L. Rold, All States Should Adopt Spousal Privilege Exception
Statutes, 55 J. Mo. B. 249, 251 (1999); see GIANNELLI, supra note 72, § 39.03
("The efficacy of this privilege, however, may be questioned. Most married
couples do not know of the privilege.. .
199. Frost, supra note 99, at 17.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id.(explaining that "the degree to which the public is aware of the
privileges and acts on that knowledge is an essential factor in determining the
utility of the marital privileges" in promoting marriage).
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privileges will not reduce the attractiveness of the marital
relationship. Consequently, a cohabiting-parent privilege would
not undermine marriage.
2. Couples Affirmatively Seeking the Protectionsof Evidentiary
Privileges
Although the marital privileges do not effectively induce the
majority of couples to marry, for some couples the privileges may
be sufficiently quantifiable, certain, and known to serve as
effective incentives. These couples consist of partners who either
have committed a crime or are contemplating committing a crime.
In such situations, the benefits of the privileges are more easily
quantifiable because the couple can anticipate the criminal
punishment that the defendant-spouse could face if prosecuted. For
instance, the couple can estimate the amount of a monetary fine or
the length of a period of incarceration that the defendant
potentially could avoid by the non-defendant-spouse exercising the
marital privileges. In these situations the benefit of the marital
privileges is also less speculative. The couple will know not only
that one spouse has committed a crime, but also whether the nondefendant-spouse possesses damaging information. Although the
arrest and prosecution of a spouse is still uncertain, these couples
are more likely to realize the benefits of the marital privileges than
couples who are not contemplating criminal activity. Finally, these
couples likely are more aware of the marital privileges because
they have an incentive to learn about the criminal proceedings they
may face if prosecuted, and they may be aware of the privileges
through their own research or through consultation with an
attorney. Additionally, because a large portion of criminals are
repeat offenders, 20 4 the defendant-spouse previously may have
been prosecuted and learned of the rules governing the marital
privileges.
In sum, the marital privileges generally are more effective
incentives to marry for couples in which one or both members
have committed a crime or are contemplating committing a crime
because the benefits of the privileges are more quantifiable,
certain, and known. Consequently, for these couples the
cohabiting-parent privilege could provide an alternative to the
204. Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of
the CriminalLaw, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 43 (2005) (explaining that "the most
likely [criminal] offenders are recidivists" and citing a number of studies in
support of that assertion); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practicesand State
Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J.
1307, 1310 (2007) ("[S]o many crimes are committed by a small percentage of
repeat offenders.").
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marital privileges. However, for several reasons, recognition of a
cohabiting-parent privilege likely would not reduce the incentive to
marry for these couples; therefore, recognition of this new
privilege would not undermine marriage.
First, for those couples who are not currently parents, the
availability of the cohabiting-parent privilege would not reduce the
incentive to marry because the marital privileges provide an easier
method to obtain the benefits of the privileges. If the couple does
not have a child the couple would have to conceive or adopt a child
to obtain the benefits of the cohabiting-parent privilege. Pregnancy
and adoption are lengthy processes and result in the extensive costs
of raising a child.2 In these situations, the option of marriage to
obtain the benefit of evidentiary privileges is significantly more
attractive because it is more expeditious and is not accompanied by
the long-term responsibilities of parenthood. Hence, a childless
couple seeking the protection of evidentiary privileges likely
would choose marriage as a means to obtain the benefits of
evidentiary privileges, regardless of the availability of a
cohabiting-parent privilege.
Though, for childless unmarried couples, the cohabiting-parent
privilege would not reduce the incentive to marry, for unmarried
parents, recognition of this new privilege could reduce the
incentive to marry provided by the marital privileges. Such couples
either would already qualify for the cohabiting-parent privilege or
simply would have to begin cohabiting to qualify. In these
circumstances, the elimination of the need to marry in order to
obtain the benefits of evidentiary privileges would also eliminate
the incentive to marry. However, the marital privileges are not
available to many of the couples in this situation, so in many
instances these couples have no incentive to marry. The
availability of the cohabiting-parent privilege, then, would have no
effect on their decision to marry. For example, some federal and
state courts exclude the couples that would benefit most from
marrying, namely couples in which both individuals participate in

205. Susan J. G. Alexander, A FairerHand: Why Courts Must Recognize the
Value of a Child's Companionship, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 273, 312 (1991)
("Parents currently spend a large amount of money to raise a child. Various
sources have come up with differing figures, but the consensus is that raising a
child . . . is an expensive undertaking."); Richard R. Bradley, Making a

Mountain Out of a Molehill: A Law and Economics Defense of Same-Sex Foster
Case Adoptions, 45 FAM. CT. REv. 133, 133 (2007) (explaining that the adoption
process "is unduly burdensome, requiring extensive amounts of time and
money").
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the crime, from the protection of the privileges. 20 6 If the privileges
applied in such situations, neither spouse would be able to testify
against the other even though they were accomplices in the same
crime. Yet, in jurisdictions that recognize this joint participation
exception, the marital privileges are unavailable if the husband and
wife participated in the same crime, so, for couples who commit
joint crimes, the availability of the cohabiting-parent privilege
would not reduce the incentive to marry because the marital
privileges are unavailable. Consequently, the marital privileges do
not served as a motivation to marry.
The marital privileges also may not serve as incentives to
marry for couples in which only one spouse has committed a
crime. In all jurisdictions, the marital communication privilege
2 7
applies only to communications made during marriage. 0
Likewise, in some jurisdictions, the spousal testimonial privilege
applies on to events that occurred after the commencement of the
The marital communication privilege, therefore, does
marriage.
not protect spouses from revealing confidential information
conveyed before marriage, and the spousal testimonial privilege
oftentimes does not prevent one spouse from testifying against
another spouse with respect to events that took place before the
marriage. Accordingly, for couples in which one spouse has
already committed a crime, the marital privileges do not serve as
strong incentives to marry because the couple may be ineligible to
receive the benefits of privileges. Even couples in which one
spouse is merely contemplating committing a crime will find the
marital privileges to be a weak incentive to marry because, like
criminal acts that occur before marriage, the premarital initial
discussions of the crime may not be protected.
In sum, the marital privileges appear to be effective incentives
to marry only for couples in which one spouse has committed a
206. See United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[A] joint participants exception is
consistent with the general policy of narrowly construing the privilege."); Amy
G. Bermingham, Note, Partnersin Crime: The Joint ParticipationException to
the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1019,
1027-32 (1985) (discussing the rationales for the joint participation exception to
the spousal testimonial privilege); Haun, supra note 174, at 164 (identifying
Alabama, Kentucky, New York, and South Dakota as having a joint
participation exception for the marital communication privilege).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The
privilege ... applies only to communications made in confidence between the
spouses during a valid marriage.").
208. Steven N. Gofinan, Note, "Honey, The Judge Says We're History":
Abrogating the Marital Privileges Via Modern Doctrines of Marital Worthiness,
77 CORNELL L. REv. 843 (1992) (reporting that the Seventh Circuit and eight
states have adopted a premarriage act exception).
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crime or is contemplating criminal conduct because only for these
couples are the benefits of marital privileges sufficiently
quantifiable, certain, and known. The majority of couples, then,
likely will not consider the privileges when deciding to marry.
Furthermore, for those couples that are incentivized to marry, the
availability of a cohabiting-parent privilege likely will not reduce
the incentive to marry. For instance, for couples that do not have
children, marriage is an easier way to obtain the benefits of the
privileges, and for couples with children, the marital privileges
may not be available if the jurisdiction recognizes a joint
participation exception or a premarital acts exception to the
privileges. Therefore, the only couples for whom the marital
privileges likely will serve as incentives to marry are those couples
who have children, who are contemplating committing a crime or
have committed a crime, and who live in jurisdictions that do not
foreclose the availability of the marital privileges to couples in
these situations. Reducing the incentive to marry for these couples
by providing cohabiting parents with evidentiary privileges is a
small price to pay to protect the large number of children born to
unmarried, cohabiting parents. In fact, "[i]t could be argued that
any marriage in which the marital privileges provide the
motivation ' 20for
the union . . . is not a relationship worth
9
protecting.
C. The Cohabiting-ParentPrivilege Could Promote Marriage
Some proponents of marriage may disfavor the extension of
marital benefits to any non-marital relationship, even if such an
extension does not reduce the incentive to marry. However, the
force of this criticism diminishes when one considers that a
cohabiting-parent privilege could actually promote marriage. For a
significant number of cohabitants, "cohabitation is an extension of
the courtship process-a prelude to marriage. ' '210 Indeed, the
percentage of first marriages that begin with cohabitation has
increased steadily, so that by the early 1990s over half of the
couples marrying for the first time began their relationship by
living together. 2 When viewed from the opposite perspective,
209. Frost, supra note 99, at 18.
210. Forste, supra note 2, at 91; see also Bumpass & Sweet, supranote 151,
at 621 ("For some [cohabitants], marriage is definitely planned and all that is at
issue is the timing of the ceremony.").
211. Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and
Implications for Children's Family Contexts in the United States, 54
POPULATION STUD. 29, 33 (2000) (reporting that between 1980 and 1984 fortythree percent of first marriages began with cohabitation and that that percentage
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namely the proportion of cohabiting relationships that result in
marriage, the connection between marriage and cohabitation is also
apparent. In the early 1980s, up to sixty percent of first-time
cohabiting relationships transitioned into marriage. 21 2 Although
half of today's
this percentage has decreased in recent years, about
2 13
marry.
eventually
couples
cohabiting
first-time
The percentage of cohabiting relationships that transition into
marriage likely increases when the couple produces a child.214 For
example, one study found that cohabiting couples "who are
pregnant with their first child are more likely to marry than to
continue cohabiting or to separate in relation to those with no
children," and "[a]lthough the effects are smaller, having children
also significantly increases the odds of marriage.' ' 215 The
researchers hypothesized that "[c]ouples who cohabit with children
already present may be more committed to the union than those
without children, and. . . that this commitment increases with time
as stronger ties are216forged between the cohabiting partner and the
child or children."
In sum, a significant portion of cohabiting relationships result
in marriage and an even greater portion of cohabiting parents
eventually formalize their unions. By failing to protect cohabiting
parents with evidentiary privileges, the law exposes relationships
that likely lead to marriage to potential disruption and dissolution.
In contrast, a cohabiting-parent privilege would protect these

increased to forty-nine percent between 1985 and 1989 and to fifty-four percent
between 1990 and 1994).
212. Bumpass & Sweet, supra note 151, at 621.
213. Bumpass & Lu, supra note 211, at 33.
214. Forste, supra note 2, at 94 ("Among cohabiting couples, having children
... increases the likelihood of marriage.").
215. Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Why Marry? Race and the
Transition to Marriage among Cohabitors, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 509, 516 (1995).
The addition of a child into the cohabitating relationship does not result in the
immediate marriage of the partners, as a recent study found that only 14.6% of
unmarried cohabitants married within one year of the birth of their child.
However, though the percentage of couples that married within a year was low, a
large portion of cohabiting relationships were still intact, as 59.6% of the couples
were still living together. Marcia Carlson, Sara McLanahan & Paula England,
Union Formationin FragileFamilies,41 DEMOGRAPHY 237, 250 tbl.2 (2004).
216. Manning & Smock, supra note 215, at 518. But see Andrea Kane &
Daniel T. Lichter, Reducing Unwed Childbearing: The Missing Link in Efforts
to Promote Marriage, BRIEF #37 (Ctr. on Children & Families, Wash., D.C.)
Apr. 2006, at 5, available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/
rc/papers/2006/04childrenfamilies kane/pb37.pdf ("For cohabiting couples,
newborn children can destabilize relationships. Children-especially if they
were unintended. . . ---can be a source of conflict and new financial pressures
that undermine the stability and health of the relationship.").
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relationships. This protection would not only benefit the child by
increasing the relationship's stability, but would also potentially
increase the number of cohabitants that eventually marry by
shielding the unmarried couples that are most likely to marry from
the discord that can result from testifying against an intimate
partner or from revealing confidential communications that were
intended to remain within the relationship.
IV. A COMPARISON TO EXTENDING EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES TO
ALL UNMARRIED COHABITANTS

In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that
evidentiary privileges should be extended either to unmarried
same-sex couples 2T7 or to ail unmarried cohabitants. 218 These
proposals have elicited criticism that goes beyond the primary
opposition to the extension of any legal consequence to nonmarital relationships, 219 namely that recognition of legal benefits
for unmarried cohabitants will reduce the incentive to marry.
However, just as the cohabiting-parent privilege is not susceptible
to the criticism that it will dissuade couples from formalizing their
union, a cohabiting-parent privilege is also less susceptible to the
additional criticisms that are specific to the recognition of
evidentiary privileges for all unmarried cohabitants.

217. See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5422.1, at n.34 ("The junior author is, indeed,

happy to abolish [the distinction between same-sex couples and heterosexual
couples] at least insofar as it affects privilege."); Jennifer R. Brannen, Note,
Unmarried with Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary Privilege to Same-Sex
Couples, 17 REv. LITIG. 311, 341 (1998) ("Extension of the marital evidentiary
privilege would insure procedural fairness for deserving couples. The law of
evidence should not discriminate against same-sex couples solely on the basis of
status.").
218. See Developments in the Law: PrivilegedCommunications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450, 1590 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (proposing a
new privilege for a number of familial relationships, including "relationships
between unmarried cohabitants" and "homosexual lovers"); Forbes, supra note
169, at 906-07 (arguing for the extension of the privileges to all unmarried
cohabitants); Krattenmaker, supra note 193, at 94 (arguing for "a general,
qualified privilege for confidential communications that pass between
individuals intimately related or in a position of close personal trust").
219. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., CalibratedCommitment: The Legal Treatment
of Marriageand Cohabitation,76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1459-60 (2001);
Teri S. O'Brien, Note, The Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage
Really Necessary?, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 439-40 (1977).
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A. Narrowly Construingthe Privilege
The first argument against extending evidentiary privileges to
all unmarried cohabitants is founded on the judicial system's truth
seeking function. America's courts are designed to discover the
truth, and, therefore, privileges, which are "exceptions to the
demand for every man's evidence," should not be "lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search
for truth., 220 Because evidentiary privileges withhold evidence
from the court, some argue that expanding the coverage of
evidentiary privileges to all unmarried cohabitants would place an
overly burdensome restriction on the court's truth seeking
function. As one critic of the expansion of evidentiary privileges
argued, "[E]videntiary privileges are intended to be a narrow
exception to the rule that a tribunal should have access to all
relevant information. Making the [marital] privilege available to
unmarried partners would significantly expand the body of
evidence 22 1that potentially could be withheld from the legal
system."
Even if this argument-that too much evidence would be
withheld from the purview of the court-is persuasive, such that
evidentiary privileges should not be extended to all unmarried
cohabitants, this argument loses much of its force when the
proposed privilege is limited to cohabiting parents. If evidentiary
privileges were extended to all unmarried cohabitants, nearly five
million couples would qualify for the privileges' protection. 22 In
contrast, a privilege for cohabiting parents would drastically
reduce the number of couples that qualify. Roughly four million
children live in cohabiting households. 2 Even if all of these
children lived in different households and were the legal children
of both cohabitants, the number of qualifying couples would be
twenty percent lower than if the privileges protected all unmarried
cohabitants. However, the number of cohabiting couples that live
with children is much lower, as only about half of all cohabiting
2
households, or 2.5 million families, include children. 74
220. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see People v.
McGraw, 190 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("Privileges should be
narrowly construed since they prevent the admission of relevant and otherwise
admissible evidence.").
221. Regan, supra note 219, at 1459-60; see O'Brien, supra note 219, at
439-40 (arguing that the privileges should be limited to married couples
"because

. .

. the privileges must be construed narrowly since they operate to

exclude valuable evidence").
222. Aycock, supra note 5, at 234 (reporting that 4.9 million children lived
with unmarried cohabitants in 2000).
223. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
224. Forste, supra note 2, at 94.
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Furthermore, the actual percentage of unmarried cohabitants that
would qualify for the cohabiting-parent privilege would be lower
than fifty percent because in many of the households both
cohabitants are undoubtedly not the legal parents of the children.
Thus, because significantly fewer couples would qualify for a
cohabiting-parent privilege than a privilege for all unmarried
cohabitants, limiting the extension of evidentiary privileges to
cohabiting parents is in keeping with the general rule that the scope
of evidentiary privileges should be narrow so as to further the
court's purpose of ascertaining the truth.
Narrowly construing evidentiary privileges entails not only
limiting the amount of evidence that is excluded, but also ensuring
that evidence is withheld only to further important policy
considerations. As Justice Frankfurter explained, evidentiary
privileges are tolerable "only to the very limited extent that
permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a
public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." He explained
further that "[t]he basic consideration . . . is whether there are
present any overriding reasons for not accepting [relevant]
evidence ....
225 This aspect of a narrow construction of
evidentiary privileges has been invoked as an argument against
extending the marital privileges to all unmarried cohabitants. As
one commentator argued, "[T]he social interest in protectin
[cohabiting] relationships is minimal, if at all existent .... 95
Therefore, "[a]n extension of the privileges to cohabitants would...
[not] advance any social goals," and, consequently, "the [marital]
privileges22should
continue to be limited to those who are actually
7
married."
Regardless of whether fostering and preserving a cohabiting
relationship provides sufficiently important policy considerations
to outweigh the competing interest of ascertaining the truth, the
protection of children is a long-recognized important societal
interest. 228 For example, states possess the inherent power of
225. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); see Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058,
1062 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[I]n deciding whether the privilege asserted should be
recognized ... [t]he court should 'weigh the need for truth against the importance
of the relationship or policy sought to be furthered by the privilege.. .. "' (quoting
Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1977))).
226. O'Brien, supra note 219, at 441.
227. Id. at 442.
228. See W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 869 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) ("The protection of the child is well recognized as an important state
interest."); G.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 791 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. Dist.
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parens patriae.22 9 This power, with origins reaching back
centuries, 230 "gives the state authority to serve as a substitute
parent and ultimate protector of children's interests" and includes
the power "to ensure [children's] safety and well-being." 231 The
state's parens patriae power manifests itself in a number of
contexts, including child custody proceedings, in which jdges
the
make decisions based on the best interests of the child;
juvenile court system, which was designed "to help delinquent and
dependant children achieve better lives";2 3 3 and abuse and neglect
laws, which aim to protect children from the mistreatment of their
parents.23 4 Child protection as a significant policy consideration is
not limited to these contexts,2 3 5 and, indeed, its importance enjoys

Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]here is no dispute that the protection of children is an
important public policy."); Wood v. Eddy, 833 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Vt. 2003)
("Society undoubtedly regards the protection of children as one of its most
important responsibilities.").
229. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890); DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, A VERY SPECIAL
PLACE IN LIFE: THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN MISSOURI 4 (2003)
(explaining that "[p]arenspatriaehas always been part of... state law").
230. See Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English Child Custody, 1660-1839: The
Origins of JudicialIntervention in Paternal Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1344,
1349-55 (1999). See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine
ofParensPatriae,27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
231. Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children,ParensPatriae,and
a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 521, 526 (1996).
232. See Huff v. Huff, 444 A.2d 396, 398 (Me. 1982) ("In making custody
determinations the trial judge must decide as a 'wise, affectionate and careful
parent' what custody arrangement will be in the child's best interest." (quoting
Cyr v. Cyr, 432 A.2d 793, 796 (Me. 1981))).
233. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 160, at 1004; see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (explaining that "early reformers were appalled by adult
procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long
prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals" and that "society's
role was not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or 'innocent,' but 'What
is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest
and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career").
234. See ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 160, at 283. A number of criminal
laws also aim to protect children. See Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like
a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to
Protect,50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 613-14 (2004) ("Today, a variety of legal means
exist to address harms committed against children. Child endangerment and
child neglect are both subject to criminalization. The criminal system also
punishes the act of causing mental harm to children and enhances punishment
for assaults or other crimes that are not directed at children, but which are
committed in their presence.").
235. See ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 160, at 16 ("The parens patriae
doctrine underlies much federal and state regulation.., in areas such as abuse,
neglect, foster care, adoption, medical decisionmaking, support and
delinquency.").
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worldwide recognition. 236 Protection of children undoubtedly is an
important societal interest that is much more firmly established
than society's interest in protecting unmarried cohabitation, and,
consequently, it serves as a more compelling basis for an
evidentiary privilege that excludes valuable information from
consideration by the court.
In sum, a cohabiting-parent privilege is more narrowly tailored
than evidentiary privileges for all unmarried cohabitants because it
applies to fewer couples and is founded on a deeply rooted,
important societal interest. The cohabiting-parent privilege is,
therefore, less susceptible to a major criticism elicited by proposals
to extend evidentiary privileges to all unmarried couples, namely
that such an expansion of evidentiary privileges beyond the marital
relationship would be overly broad and would not outweigh
society's interest in ascertaining the truth.
B. Avoiding Individual JudicialDeterminationsof the Privilege's
Applicability
A second concern raised by extending evidentiary privileges to
all unmarried cohabitants is that the courts must make difficult
individual determinations as to whether a particular couple is
worthy of the privileges' protections. Proposals for the extension
of evidentiary privileges to either same-sex couples or all
unmarried cohabitants typically do not suggest that every couole
2 37
living together should enjoy the benefits of the privileges.
236. Edward J. Eberle, The View Outside: What Kind of Expression for
Adolescents Outside the United States?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 879, 904
(2005).
237. See Peter Nicolas, "They Say He's Gay": The Admissibility of Evidence
of Sexual Orientation, 37 GA. L. REv. 793, 872 (2003) ("[F]or same-sex
couples, [the applicability of the privilege] is simply a matter in some cases of
asking if they have registered as domestic partners or have entered into a civil
union. . . , or asking them to provide evidence that they live together and share
basic living expenses."); Elizabeth Kimberly (Kyhm) Penfil, In Light of Reason
and Experience: Should Federal Evidence Law Protect Confidential
Communications Between Same-Sex Partners?, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 815, 844
(2005) (suggesting that "courts might inquire whether the [same-sex] partners
have created as much of a marriage as the law allows them to" and providing
five criteria the court should consider, including "whether the partners
cohabitate," "whether the partners are jointly responsible for 'basic living
expenses' or share other financial responsibilities," "whether the partners are
both on the deed or lease to their home," "whether the partners have made
provisions for each other," and "the length of the relationship and the intentions
of both partners regarding the permanence of relationship"); Forbes, supra note
169, at 905 ("Cohabitating couples should not be entitled to the spousal
testimony privilege based solely on their living together.").
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Instead, only certain cohabitants that display indicia of a
committed and intimate relationship should be provided the
benefits of evidentiary privileges under these proposals. For
example, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that any proposal
of evidentiary privileges for unmarried cohabitants would require
courts to make "a case by case qualitative and quantitative analysis
of such factors as [the couple's] intimacy voluntary commitment,
stability and psychological involvement."
Some federal courts already make similar determinations when
deciding whether to allow married couples to invoke the marital
privileges. As one commentator observed, "The rule that the
validity of a marriage for purposes of marital privileges is to be
determined according to state law has recently begun to be eroded
by the adoption by some federal courts of the 'bum marriage'
doctrine. ' 239 This doctrine, also known as the "viability
doctrine,'24° permits the courts to look into the state of the
marriage to determine whether the protection of the relationship
outweighs the suppression of evidence that would result if the
marital privileges were to apply.241 If the marital relationship is in
disrepair or lacks the intimacy and commitment that is the
hallmark of a traditional marriage, the courts will refuse to apply
the privilege. 24 2 As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
explained, "[T]he testimonial privilege may not be asserted where
the marriage between the defendant and the testifying spouse is in
fact moribund, though legally still valid., 243 In such cases,
application of the privilege "could not possibly achieve the
intended benefit244of the rule and would serve only to thwart
common sense."

The viability doctrine, however, has elicited criticism. The first
concern raised by this doctrine is that courts are ill-equipped to
efficiently make individual determinations of the privilege's
applicability beyond simply determining whether the couple is
married, and "[a]ny attempt to develop this expertise and to gather
the information to make such a determination would be unduly
time-consuming. 245 Similarly, prior to the emergence of the
238.
239.
240.
241.

State v. Watkins, 614 P.2d 835, 840 (Ariz. 1980).
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18, § 5573.
See Gofman, supra note 208, at 860.
See id.
(providing a detailed explanation of the viability doctrine); see

also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18, § 5573.
242. See Gofnan, supra note 208, at 860; see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 18, § 5573.
243. United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1984).
244. United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1975).
245. David Medine, The Adverse Testimony Privilege: Time to Dispose of a
'Sentimental Relic,' 67 OR. L. REv. 519, 532 (1988) (explaining further that
"[a]sessing whether marriages merit protection would force courts to hold
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viability doctrine, Judge Learned Hand cautioned against judicial
assessment of the state of a marital relationship: "[I]t [is] [n]either
practicable [n]or desirable to make" the applicability of the marital
privileges "dependent upon the judge's conclusion that in the
instance before him the marriage has already been so far wrecked
that there is nothing to save" because "[t]he question will always
arise in the progress of the trial.. . and its answer will introduce a
collateral inquiry likely to complicate the trial seriously." 246 A
related second criticism of the viability doctrine is that, because
courts have not fashioned a clear set of criteria with which to
assess marital relationships, an assessment of the state of a
particular marriage largely depends on the individual
beliefs and
247
biases of the court making the determination.
Similar to the courts' involvement in assessing the viability of
a particular marriage, potential individual judicial determinations
of the applicability of evidentiary privileges for unmarried
cohabitants have also elicited criticism, which has largely echoed
the arguments associated with the marital viability doctrine. As one
critic explained:
[T]he court would have to conduct an in-depth inquiry into
every unmarried relationship that is asserted as the basis for
the privilege. . . .[T]his would increase the probability of
contradictory and unpredictable decisions. The ramifications
of this may be especially serious, because inconsistent
exclusion of evidence could erode confidence
2 48 in the ability
of the legal system to arrive at just decisions.
Another critic argued that "[e]xpanding . . . privileges [to]
unmarried cohabitants is fraught with difficulties of judicial
administration" and "[t]he individual determinations this would
require would result in an increased burden on an already clogged
minitrials during criminal cases to determine the viability of marriages," and
"[t]herefore, criminal proceedings are not appropriate forums for evaluating the
condition of particular marriages"); see Byrd, 750 F.2d at 592 ("[T]he making of
the determinations of when a marriage has deteriorated to the point when its
communications are no longer confidential would involve courts in difficult
factual inquires in which we are reluctant to require trial courts to become
involved."); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that
"given the theoretical and empirical difficulties of assessing the utility of [a]
marriage[]" the court is "not confident that courts can assess the social
worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the
protection of the privilege").
246. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949).
247. See Gofman, supra note 208, at 861; Medine, supra note 245, at 533.
248. Regan, supra note 219, at 1459.
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court system. ' 249 Proponents of extending evidentiary privileges to
unmarried cohabitants acknowledge that the individual judicial
determinations of the privileges' applicability would create
significant administrative difficulties for the courts. 250 These
administrative difficulties are founded on "the costs of uncertainty
' 25
arising from the recognition of nonformalized relationships." 1
In contrast to the marital privileges, a privilege for all
unmarried cohabitants would produce these costs of uncertainty
because the determination of the privilege's application "is not as
easy as *ust looking to whether or not the couple has a marriage
license. ' ' 52 Instead, the courts would have to make value
determinations as to a couple's worthiness of protection because
the courts lack an easily identifiable proxy for a relationship that is
worthy of protection, such as a legally valid marriage. Implicit in
proposals for an evidentiary privilege for all unmarried cohabitants
is the belief that the benefit of the privilege outweighs the
administrative
difficulties
that
accompany
uncertain
253
administration.
Regardless of the merits of this argument, a
cohabiting-parent privilege is much less susceptible to the claim
that it would create these administrative burdens.
As previously explained, the marital privileges provide few
administrative difficulties because the courts need only determine
whether a couple is legally married for the privileges to be
available. Similarly, a court could also easily determine the
applicability of the cohabiting-parent privilege. The court must
first determine the legal parentage of the child. In many cases, this
249. O'Brien, supra note 219, at 440. The author continues:
It is unclear, for example, how long a couple should have to cohabit to
trigger the privilege. In addition, any extension would likely apply only
to those meretricious spouses involved in stable family situations. As a
result, the trial court would bear the massive burden of determining the
requirements for establishing the existence of a stable relationship and
of evaluating the facts of each case to ascertain whether the
requirements have been satisfied.
Id. at 440 n.174.
250. See Brannen, supra note 217, at 337-38; Developments in the Law,
supra note 218, at 1591 ("Clearly, courts might have difficulty in determining
whether a particular relationship is sufficiently 'intimate' to warrant recognition
of a privilege."); Penfil, supra note 237, at 844-45 (recognizing "the practical
considerations of extending the privilege to same-sex partners" and concluding
that they "are not insurmountable").
251. Mahoney, supra note 3, at 196.
252. Nicolas, supra note 237, at 872.
253. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 190 (explaining that "[p]roponents of
legal recognition [of unmarried cohabitation] believe that the costs associated
with [this] uncertainty about legal family status would be outweighed by the
benefits of recognition," such as "the fairness to family members and the
stabilization of de facto families").
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requires a simple check of the child's birth certificate or adoption
records. In cases in which legal parentage is disputed, though, the
determination of the cohabiting-parent privilege's applicability
would not be so simple. Some may argue that determining legal
parentage in these cases would impose the same administrative
burdens on the courts as would a privilege for all unmarried
cohabitants because such a determination would require an indepth collateral inquiry. However, to avoid these collateral
inquiries, birth certificates and adoption records could be deemed
conclusive proof of legal parentage for purposes of determining the
applicability of the cohabiting-parent privilege. Permitting courts
to look only to these records would eliminate potential
administrative difficulties, and parties wishing to dispute legal
parentage would be directed to pursue their claims in separate legal
proceedings.
To determine whether a couple qualifies for the cohabitingparent privilege, the courts must also determine whether the couple
is cohabiting. This may be a more fact-intensive task than simply
checking a birth certificate or marriage license, but, unlike a
determination of whether a couple exhibits the characteristics of a
committed relationship, it is not a factual determination that is
foreign to the courts. The courts need not make a value judgment
regarding the worthiness or viability of a particular couple, but
must simply make a typical factual determination based upon the
available evidence.
In sum, the cohabiting-parent privilege may require slightly
more work by the courts than the marital privileges because the
courts would have to determine parentage of the child and the
residency of the couple instead of merely determining whether a
couple is validly married. On the other hand, a cohabiting-parent
privilege would place a significantly lesser administrative burden
on the courts than a privilege for all unmarried cohabitants because
the courts need not make in-depth inquiries into the state of
couples' marital relationships.
CONCLUSION

The law provides marriage a privileged status, and married
couples enjoy a number of benefits as a result of their union. Two
of the oldest benefits conferred upon marriage are the marital
privileges, which today consist of the spousal testimonial privilege
and the marital communication privilege. These privileges are
designed to avoid the marital discord that could follow from one
spouse testifying against the other and to strengthen the marital
union by encouraging open communication between the spouses.
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Not only are these privileges designed to protect the husband and
wife, but they are also meant to protect the children of the
mamage. Parental separation can have severe emotional,
developmental, and financial effects on the child. Therefore, by
potentially strengthening the marriage, the marital privileges aim
to protect children from the harms of divorce and parental
separation.
Though in the past most children may have been protected by
the marital privileges, America's families are changing. Instead of
the vast majority of children being born and reared within
marriage, unmarried couples increasingly are becoming parents.
Not only are unmarried couples bringing children into the world,
but they are also rearing their offspring together under the same
roof. Consequently, the distinction between families united by
marriage and families living together without a formal union has
become blurred. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained almost a
decade ago, because "[t]he demographic changes of the past
century" have caused "[t]he composition of families [to] var[y]
greatly from household to household,"
it is "difficult to speak of an
254
average American family.
Even though the law currently does not provide the protections
of evidentiary privileges to children of unmarried cohabitants,
parental separation can have the same negative effects on all
children, regardless of whether they were born inside or outside of
marriage. Thus, this Article proposes a new evidentiary privilege
that would protect the growing number of children who live in
families that on the surface might look like traditional families, but
whose parents are unmarried and cohabiting. This new cohabitingparent privilege would allow unmarried, cohabiting parents to
invoke the same evidentiary privileges that married couples
currently enjoy.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 directs federal courts to
recognize new evidentiary privileges "in light of reason and
experience." 255 Although a cohabiting-parent privilege lacks
historical recognition, both society and the law have long
recognized the underlying interest of protecting children. Not
coincidentally, the protection of marital children is a principal
objective of the marital privileges, which is based upon a rationale
that the preservation of marriage safeguards the stable environment
best suited for childrearing. Reason surely suggests that, as the
number of children born outside of marriage continues to increase,
new evidentiary privileges should be developed to protect these
children. Federal courts, therefore, should exercise the discretion
254.
255.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000).
FED. R. EvID. 501.
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bestowed upon them by the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and should recognize a new evidentiary privilege for
cohabiting parents. Likewise, state legislatures and state courts
should utilize their respective powers256 to provide children of
unmarried cohabitants the protection that reason and experience
require.

256. See Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An
Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 780 (1999)
("Unlike the federal judiciary, state courts play a limited role in the introduction
of new privileges. During the past two decades, the majority of new state
evidentiary privileges have been introduced by statute. 'The development of
[state] judge-made privileges [has] virtually halted."' (quoting CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 156 (4th ed. 1992))).

